From: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
To: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 13/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Adjust SPTE_MMIO_ALLOWED_MASK to understand MBEC
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2025 13:36:52 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250313203702.575156-14-jon@nutanix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250313203702.575156-1-jon@nutanix.com>
Adjust the SPTE_MMIO_ALLOWED_MASK and associated values to make these
masks aware of PTE Bit 10, to be used by Intel MBEC.
Intel SDM 30.3.3.1 EPT Misconfigurations states:
An EPT misconfiguration occurs if translation of a guest-physical
address encounters an EPT paging-structure entry that meets any of
the following conditions:
- Bit 0 of the entry is clear (indicating that data reads are not
allowed) and any of the following hold:
— Bit 1 is set (indicating that data writes are allowed).
— The processor does not support execute-only translations and
either of the following hold:
- Bit 2 is set (indicating that instruction fetches are allowed)
Note: If the “mode-based execute control for EPT” VM-execution
control is 1, setting bit 2 indicates that instruction fetches
are allowed from supervisor-mode linear addresses.
- The “mode-based execute control for EPT” VM-execution control
is 1 and bit 10 is set (indicating that instruction fetches
are allowed from user-mode linear addresses).
For LKML Review:
SDM 30.3.3.1 also states that "Software should read the VMX capability
MSR IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP to determine whether execute-only
translations are supported (see Appendix A.10)." A.10 indicates that
this is specified by bit 0; if bit 0 is 1, then the processor supports
execute-only transactions by EPT.
Searching around a bit, it looks like this bit is checked by
vmx/capabilities.h:cpu_has_vmx_ept_execute_only(), which is used only
in kvm/vmx/vmx.c:vmx_hardware_setup(), passed as the has_exec_only
argument to kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(), which uses it to set
shadow_present_mask.
I'm not sure if this actually matters for this change(?), but thought
it was at least worth surfacing for others to consider.
Signed-off-by: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 6 ++++--
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 13 +++++++------
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index 84c5be416f5c..961d37e108b5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -541,7 +541,8 @@ enum vmcs_field {
#define VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT (1ull << 63)
#define VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK (VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK | \
VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK | \
- VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK)
+ VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK | \
+ VMX_EPT_USER_EXECUTABLE_MASK)
#define VMX_EPT_MT_MASK (7ull << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT)
static inline u8 vmx_eptp_page_walk_level(u64 eptp)
@@ -558,7 +559,8 @@ static inline u8 vmx_eptp_page_walk_level(u64 eptp)
/* The mask to use to trigger an EPT Misconfiguration in order to track MMIO */
#define VMX_EPT_MISCONFIG_WX_VALUE (VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK | \
- VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK)
+ VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK | \
+ VMX_EPT_USER_EXECUTABLE_MASK)
#define VMX_EPT_IDENTITY_PAGETABLE_ADDR 0xfffbc000ul
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
index dc2f0dc9c46e..1f7b388a56aa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
@@ -98,11 +98,11 @@ static_assert(!(EPT_SPTE_MMU_WRITABLE & SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_MASK));
#undef SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_MASK
/*
- * Due to limited space in PTEs, the MMIO generation is a 19 bit subset of
+ * Due to limited space in PTEs, the MMIO generation is a 18 bit subset of
* the memslots generation and is derived as follows:
*
- * Bits 0-7 of the MMIO generation are propagated to spte bits 3-10
- * Bits 8-18 of the MMIO generation are propagated to spte bits 52-62
+ * Bits 0-6 of the MMIO generation are propagated to spte bits 3-9
+ * Bits 7-17 of the MMIO generation are propagated to spte bits 52-62
*
* The KVM_MEMSLOT_GEN_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS flag is intentionally not included in
* the MMIO generation number, as doing so would require stealing a bit from
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static_assert(!(EPT_SPTE_MMU_WRITABLE & SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_MASK));
*/
#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_START 3
-#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_END 10
+#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_END 9
#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_START 52
#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_END 62
@@ -135,7 +135,8 @@ static_assert(!(SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK &
* and so they're off-limits for generation; additional checks ensure the mask
* doesn't overlap legal PA bits), and bit 63 (carved out for future usage).
*/
-#define SPTE_MMIO_ALLOWED_MASK (BIT_ULL(63) | GENMASK_ULL(51, 12) | GENMASK_ULL(2, 0))
+#define SPTE_MMIO_ALLOWED_MASK (BIT_ULL(63) | GENMASK_ULL(51, 12) | \
+ BIT_ULL(10) | GENMASK_ULL(2, 0))
static_assert(!(SPTE_MMIO_ALLOWED_MASK &
(SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK | MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK | MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK)));
@@ -143,7 +144,7 @@ static_assert(!(SPTE_MMIO_ALLOWED_MASK &
#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS (MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_END - MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_START + 1)
/* remember to adjust the comment above as well if you change these */
-static_assert(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS == 8 && MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS == 11);
+static_assert(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS == 7 && MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS == 11);
#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_SHIFT (MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_START - 0)
#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_SHIFT (MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_START - MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS)
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-03-13 20:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-03-13 20:36 [RFC PATCH 00/18] KVM: VMX: Introduce Intel Mode-Based Execute Control (MBEC) Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 01/18] KVM: VMX: Remove EPT_VIOLATIONS_ACC_*_BIT defines Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 02/18] KVM: nVMX: Decouple EPT RWX bits from EPT Violation protection bits Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 03/18] KVM: x86: Add module parameter for Intel MBEC Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13 2:18 ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-13 7:57 ` Shah, Amit
2025-12-23 4:15 ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 04/18] KVM: VMX: add cpu_has_vmx_mbec helper Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:14 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13 2:17 ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 05/18] KVM: x86: Add pt_guest_exec_control to kvm_vcpu_arch Jon Kohler
2025-04-22 6:27 ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 18:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23 4:15 ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 06/18] KVM: VMX: Wire up Intel MBEC enable/disable logic Jon Kohler
2025-04-22 7:06 ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 18:23 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13 2:16 ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-13 13:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-14 11:14 ` Shah, Amit
2025-05-14 12:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-16 9:27 ` Shah, Amit
2025-06-17 14:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-07-09 13:40 ` Shah, Amit
2025-12-23 4:15 ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 07/18] KVM: VMX: Define VMX_EPT_USER_EXECUTABLE_MASK Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 08/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Remove SPTE_PERM_MASK Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 09/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend access bitfield in kvm_mmu_page_role Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13 2:14 ` Jon Kohler
2025-12-23 4:15 ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 10/18] KVM: VMX: Extend EPT Violation protection bits Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23 4:15 ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 11/18] KVM: VMX: Enhance EPT violation handler for PROT_USER_EXEC Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23 4:15 ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 12/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Introduce shadow_ux_mask Jon Kohler
2025-04-23 3:06 ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 19:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23 4:15 ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` Jon Kohler [this message]
2025-04-23 5:37 ` [RFC PATCH 13/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Adjust SPTE_MMIO_ALLOWED_MASK to understand MBEC Chao Gao
2025-05-12 19:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13 2:11 ` Jon Kohler
2025-12-23 4:15 ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 14/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend is_executable_pte " Jon Kohler
2025-04-23 6:16 ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 21:16 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13 2:09 ` Jon Kohler
2025-12-23 4:15 ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 15/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend make_spte " Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13 2:04 ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-13 17:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23 4:15 ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 16/18] KVM: nVMX: Setup Intel MBEC in nested secondary controls Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23 4:15 ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 17/18] KVM: VMX: Allow MBEC with EVMCS Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13 2:01 ` Jon Kohler
2025-12-23 4:16 ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 18/18] KVM: x86: Enable module parameter for MBEC Jon Kohler
2025-04-15 9:29 ` [RFC PATCH 00/18] KVM: VMX: Introduce Intel Mode-Based Execute Control (MBEC) Mickaël Salaün
2025-04-15 14:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-12 15:26 ` Jon Kohler
2025-04-15 14:43 ` Jon Kohler
2025-04-16 15:44 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-04-23 13:54 ` Adrian-Ken Rueegsegger
2025-05-12 15:26 ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13 1:59 ` Jon Kohler
2025-12-23 4:17 ` Jon Kohler
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