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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
	bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
	hpa@zytor.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Sergey Dyasli" <sergey.dyasli@nutanix.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 09/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend access bitfield in kvm_mmu_page_role
Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 11:32:47 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aCI-z5vzzLwxOCfw@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250313203702.575156-10-jon@nutanix.com>

On Thu, Mar 13, 2025, Jon Kohler wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
> index 71d6fe28fafc..d9e22133b6d0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
> @@ -45,7 +45,9 @@ static_assert(SPTE_TDP_AD_ENABLED == 0);
>  #define ACC_EXEC_MASK    1
>  #define ACC_WRITE_MASK   PT_WRITABLE_MASK
>  #define ACC_USER_MASK    PT_USER_MASK
> -#define ACC_ALL          (ACC_EXEC_MASK | ACC_WRITE_MASK | ACC_USER_MASK)
> +#define ACC_USER_EXEC_MASK (1ULL << 3)
> +#define ACC_ALL          (ACC_EXEC_MASK | ACC_WRITE_MASK | ACC_USER_MASK | \
> +			  ACC_USER_EXEC_MASK)

This is very subtly a massive change, and I'm not convinced its one we want to
make.  All usage in the non-nested TDP flows is arguably wrong, because KVM should
never enable MBEC when using non-nested TDP.

And the use in kvm_calc_shadow_ept_root_page_role() is wrong, because the root
page role shouldn't include ACC_USER_EXEC_MASK if the associated VMCS doesn't
have MBEC.  Ditto for the use in kvm_calc_cpu_role().

So I'm pretty sure the only bit of this change that is desriable/correct is the
usage in kvm_mmu_page_get_access().  (And I guess maybe trace_mark_mmio_spte()?)

Off the cuff, I don't know what the best approach is.  One thought would be to
prep for adding ACC_USER_EXEC_MASK to ACC_ALL by introducing ACC_RWX and using
that where KVM really just wants to set RWX permissions.  That would free up
ACC_ALL for the few cases where KVM really truly wants to capture all access bits.

  reply	other threads:[~2025-05-12 18:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-03-13 20:36 [RFC PATCH 00/18] KVM: VMX: Introduce Intel Mode-Based Execute Control (MBEC) Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 01/18] KVM: VMX: Remove EPT_VIOLATIONS_ACC_*_BIT defines Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 02/18] KVM: nVMX: Decouple EPT RWX bits from EPT Violation protection bits Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 03/18] KVM: x86: Add module parameter for Intel MBEC Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:08   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:18     ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-13  7:57       ` Shah, Amit
2025-12-23  4:15       ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 04/18] KVM: VMX: add cpu_has_vmx_mbec helper Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:14   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:17     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 05/18] KVM: x86: Add pt_guest_exec_control to kvm_vcpu_arch Jon Kohler
2025-04-22  6:27   ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 18:15   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 06/18] KVM: VMX: Wire up Intel MBEC enable/disable logic Jon Kohler
2025-04-22  7:06   ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 18:23   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:16     ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-13 13:28       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-14 11:14         ` Shah, Amit
2025-05-14 12:55           ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-16  9:27             ` Shah, Amit
2025-06-17 14:13               ` Sean Christopherson
2025-07-09 13:40                 ` Shah, Amit
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 07/18] KVM: VMX: Define VMX_EPT_USER_EXECUTABLE_MASK Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 08/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Remove SPTE_PERM_MASK Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 09/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend access bitfield in kvm_mmu_page_role Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:32   ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-05-13  2:14     ` Jon Kohler
2025-12-23  4:15       ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 10/18] KVM: VMX: Extend EPT Violation protection bits Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:37   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 11/18] KVM: VMX: Enhance EPT violation handler for PROT_USER_EXEC Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:54   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 12/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Introduce shadow_ux_mask Jon Kohler
2025-04-23  3:06   ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 19:13   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 13/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Adjust SPTE_MMIO_ALLOWED_MASK to understand MBEC Jon Kohler
2025-04-23  5:37   ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 19:37   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:11     ` Jon Kohler
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 14/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend is_executable_pte " Jon Kohler
2025-04-23  6:16   ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 21:16   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:09     ` Jon Kohler
2025-12-23  4:15       ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 15/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend make_spte " Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:29   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:04     ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-13 17:54       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 16/18] KVM: nVMX: Setup Intel MBEC in nested secondary controls Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:32   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 17/18] KVM: VMX: Allow MBEC with EVMCS Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:35   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:01     ` Jon Kohler
2025-12-23  4:16       ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 18/18] KVM: x86: Enable module parameter for MBEC Jon Kohler
2025-04-15  9:29 ` [RFC PATCH 00/18] KVM: VMX: Introduce Intel Mode-Based Execute Control (MBEC) Mickaël Salaün
2025-04-15 14:43   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-12 15:26     ` Jon Kohler
2025-04-15 14:43   ` Jon Kohler
2025-04-16 15:44     ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-04-23 13:54 ` Adrian-Ken Rueegsegger
2025-05-12 15:26   ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  1:59   ` Jon Kohler
2025-12-23  4:17   ` Jon Kohler

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