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From: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
To: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 06/18] KVM: VMX: Wire up Intel MBEC enable/disable logic
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2025 13:36:45 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250313203702.575156-7-jon@nutanix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250313203702.575156-1-jon@nutanix.com>

Add logic to enable / disable Intel Mode Based Execution Control (MBEC)
based on specific conditions.

MBEC depends on:
- User space exposing secondary execution control bit 22
- Extended Page Tables (EPT)
- The KVM module parameter `enable_pt_guest_exec_control`

If any of these conditions are not met, MBEC will be disabled
accordingly.

Store runtime enablement within `kvm_vcpu_arch.pt_guest_exec_control`.

Signed-off-by: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h |  7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 7a98f03ef146..116910159a3f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -2694,6 +2694,7 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
 			return -EIO;
 
 		vmx_cap->ept = 0;
+		_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC;
 		_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE;
 	}
 	if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID) &&
@@ -4641,11 +4642,15 @@ static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID;
 	if (!enable_ept) {
 		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT;
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC;
 		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE;
 		enable_unrestricted_guest = 0;
 	}
 	if (!enable_unrestricted_guest)
 		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
+	if (!enable_pt_guest_exec_control)
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC;
+
 	if (kvm_pause_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
 		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING;
 	if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
@@ -4770,6 +4775,9 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 		if (vmx->ve_info)
 			vmcs_write64(VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS,
 				     __pa(vmx->ve_info));
+
+		vmx->vcpu.arch.pt_guest_exec_control =
+			enable_pt_guest_exec_control && vmx_has_mbec(vmx);
 	}
 
 	if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls())
@@ -8472,6 +8480,9 @@ __init int vmx_hardware_setup(void)
 	if (!cpu_has_vmx_unrestricted_guest() || !enable_ept)
 		enable_unrestricted_guest = 0;
 
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_mbec() || !enable_ept)
+		enable_pt_guest_exec_control = false;
+
 	if (!cpu_has_vmx_flexpriority())
 		flexpriority_enabled = 0;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index d1e537bf50ea..9f4ae3139a90 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -580,6 +580,7 @@ static inline u8 vmx_get_rvi(void)
 	 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC |					\
 	 SECONDARY_EXEC_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION |				\
 	 SECONDARY_EXEC_NOTIFY_VM_EXITING |				\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC |				\
 	 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING |					\
 	 SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE)
 
@@ -721,6 +722,12 @@ static inline bool vmx_has_waitpkg(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 		SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE;
 }
 
+static inline bool vmx_has_mbec(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	return secondary_exec_controls_get(vmx) &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC;
+}
+
 static inline bool vmx_need_pf_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (!enable_ept)
-- 
2.43.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-03-13 20:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-03-13 20:36 [RFC PATCH 00/18] KVM: VMX: Introduce Intel Mode-Based Execute Control (MBEC) Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 01/18] KVM: VMX: Remove EPT_VIOLATIONS_ACC_*_BIT defines Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 02/18] KVM: nVMX: Decouple EPT RWX bits from EPT Violation protection bits Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 03/18] KVM: x86: Add module parameter for Intel MBEC Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:08   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:18     ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-13  7:57       ` Shah, Amit
2025-12-23  4:15       ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 04/18] KVM: VMX: add cpu_has_vmx_mbec helper Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:14   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:17     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 05/18] KVM: x86: Add pt_guest_exec_control to kvm_vcpu_arch Jon Kohler
2025-04-22  6:27   ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 18:15   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` Jon Kohler [this message]
2025-04-22  7:06   ` [RFC PATCH 06/18] KVM: VMX: Wire up Intel MBEC enable/disable logic Chao Gao
2025-05-12 18:23   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:16     ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-13 13:28       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-14 11:14         ` Shah, Amit
2025-05-14 12:55           ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-16  9:27             ` Shah, Amit
2025-06-17 14:13               ` Sean Christopherson
2025-07-09 13:40                 ` Shah, Amit
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 07/18] KVM: VMX: Define VMX_EPT_USER_EXECUTABLE_MASK Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 08/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Remove SPTE_PERM_MASK Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 09/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend access bitfield in kvm_mmu_page_role Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:32   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:14     ` Jon Kohler
2025-12-23  4:15       ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 10/18] KVM: VMX: Extend EPT Violation protection bits Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:37   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 11/18] KVM: VMX: Enhance EPT violation handler for PROT_USER_EXEC Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:54   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 12/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Introduce shadow_ux_mask Jon Kohler
2025-04-23  3:06   ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 19:13   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 13/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Adjust SPTE_MMIO_ALLOWED_MASK to understand MBEC Jon Kohler
2025-04-23  5:37   ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 19:37   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:11     ` Jon Kohler
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 14/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend is_executable_pte " Jon Kohler
2025-04-23  6:16   ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 21:16   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:09     ` Jon Kohler
2025-12-23  4:15       ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 15/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend make_spte " Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:29   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:04     ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-13 17:54       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 16/18] KVM: nVMX: Setup Intel MBEC in nested secondary controls Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:32   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 17/18] KVM: VMX: Allow MBEC with EVMCS Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:35   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:01     ` Jon Kohler
2025-12-23  4:16       ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 18/18] KVM: x86: Enable module parameter for MBEC Jon Kohler
2025-04-15  9:29 ` [RFC PATCH 00/18] KVM: VMX: Introduce Intel Mode-Based Execute Control (MBEC) Mickaël Salaün
2025-04-15 14:43   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-12 15:26     ` Jon Kohler
2025-04-15 14:43   ` Jon Kohler
2025-04-16 15:44     ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-04-23 13:54 ` Adrian-Ken Rueegsegger
2025-05-12 15:26   ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  1:59   ` Jon Kohler
2025-12-23  4:17   ` Jon Kohler

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