[RFC PATCH 11/18] KVM: VMX: Enhance EPT violation handler for PROT_USER_EXEC

[Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>]

From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>

Add EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC (6) to reflect the user executable
permissions of a given address when Intel MBEC is enabled.

Refactor usage of EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_TO_PROT to understand all of the
specific bits that are now possible with MBEC.

Intel SDM 'Exit Qualification for EPT Violations' states the following
for Bit 6.
  If the “mode-based execute control” VM-execution control is 0, the
  value of this bit is undefined. If that control is 1, this bit is
  the logical-AND of bit 10 in the EPT paging-structure entries used
  to translate the guest-physical address of the access causing the
  EPT violation. In this case, it indicates whether the guest-physical
  address was executable for user-mode linear addresses.

  Bit 6 is cleared to 0 if (1) the “mode-based execute control”
  VM-execution control is 1; and (2) either (a) any of EPT
  paging-structure entries used to translate the guest-physical address
  of the access causing the EPT violation is not present; or
  (b) 4-level EPT is in use and the guest-physical address sets any
  bits in the range 51:48.

Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Co-developed-by: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h     |  7 ++++---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 15 ++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c         |  7 +++++--
 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index ffc90d672b5d..84c5be416f5c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -587,6 +587,7 @@ enum vm_entry_failure_code {
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ		BIT(3)
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE	BIT(4)
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC		BIT(5)
+#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC	BIT(6)
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK		(EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ  | \
 					 EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE | \
 					 EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC)
@@ -596,7 +597,7 @@ enum vm_entry_failure_code {
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_READ_TO_PROT(__epte) (((__epte) & VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK) << 3)
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_WRITE_TO_PROT(__epte) (((__epte) & VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK) << 3)
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_TO_PROT(__epte) (((__epte) & VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK) << 3)
-#define EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_TO_PROT(__epte) (((__epte) & VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK) << 3)
+#define EPT_VIOLATION_USER_EXEC_TO_PROT(__epte) (((__epte) & VMX_EPT_USER_EXECUTABLE_MASK) >> 4)
 
 static_assert(EPT_VIOLATION_READ_TO_PROT(VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK) ==
 	      (EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ));
@@ -604,8 +605,8 @@ static_assert(EPT_VIOLATION_WRITE_TO_PROT(VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK) ==
 	      (EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE));
 static_assert(EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_TO_PROT(VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK) ==
 	      (EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC));
-static_assert(EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_TO_PROT(VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK) ==
-	      (EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ | EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE | EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC));
+static_assert(EPT_VIOLATION_USER_EXEC_TO_PROT(VMX_EPT_USER_EXECUTABLE_MASK) ==
+	      (EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC));
 
 /*
  * Exit Qualifications for NOTIFY VM EXIT
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
index 9bc3fc4a238b..a3a5cacda614 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
@@ -181,8 +181,9 @@ static inline unsigned FNAME(gpte_access)(u64 gpte)
 	unsigned access;
 #if PTTYPE == PTTYPE_EPT
 	access = ((gpte & VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK) ? ACC_WRITE_MASK : 0) |
-		((gpte & VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK) ? ACC_EXEC_MASK : 0) |
-		((gpte & VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK) ? ACC_USER_MASK : 0);
+		 ((gpte & VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK) ? ACC_EXEC_MASK : 0) |
+		 ((gpte & VMX_EPT_USER_EXECUTABLE_MASK) ? ACC_USER_EXEC_MASK : 0) |
+		 ((gpte & VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK) ? ACC_USER_MASK : 0);
 #else
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(ACC_EXEC_MASK != PT_PRESENT_MASK);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(ACC_EXEC_MASK != 1);
@@ -510,7 +511,15 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
 		 * Note, pte_access holds the raw RWX bits from the EPTE, not
 		 * ACC_*_MASK flags!
 		 */
-		walker->fault.exit_qualification |= EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_TO_PROT(pte_access);
+		walker->fault.exit_qualification |=
+			EPT_VIOLATION_READ_TO_PROT(pte_access);
+		walker->fault.exit_qualification |=
+			EPT_VIOLATION_WRITE_TO_PROT(pte_access);
+		walker->fault.exit_qualification |=
+			EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_TO_PROT(pte_access);
+		if (vcpu->arch.pt_guest_exec_control)
+			walker->fault.exit_qualification |=
+				EPT_VIOLATION_USER_EXEC_TO_PROT(pte_access);
 	}
 #endif
 	walker->fault.address = addr;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 116910159a3f..0aadfa924045 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -5809,7 +5809,7 @@ static int handle_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	unsigned long exit_qualification;
+	unsigned long exit_qualification, rwx_mask;
 	gpa_t gpa;
 	u64 error_code;
 
@@ -5839,7 +5839,10 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR)
 		      ? PFERR_FETCH_MASK : 0;
 	/* ept page table entry is present? */
-	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK)
+	rwx_mask = EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK;
+	if (vcpu->arch.pt_guest_exec_control)
+		rwx_mask |= EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC;
+	error_code |= (exit_qualification & rwx_mask)
 		      ? PFERR_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
 
 	if (error_code & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID)
-- 
2.43.0