From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v6 20/21] x86/bugs: Print enabled attack vectors
Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2025 13:33:15 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250707183316.1349127-21-david.kaplan@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250707183316.1349127-1-david.kaplan@amd.com>
Print the status of enabled attack vectors and SMT mitigation status in the
boot log for easier reporting and debugging. This information will also be
available through sysfs.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 7972c9b16e8a..917acf99eb6a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -187,6 +187,39 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cpu_buf_vm_clear);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_buf_vm_clear);
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "mitigations: " fmt
+
+static void __init cpu_print_attack_vectors(void)
+{
+ pr_info("Enabled attack vectors: ");
+
+ if (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL))
+ pr_cont("user_kernel, ");
+
+ if (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_USER_USER))
+ pr_cont("user_user, ");
+
+ if (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST))
+ pr_cont("guest_host, ");
+
+ if (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_GUEST))
+ pr_cont("guest_guest, ");
+
+ pr_cont("SMT mitigations: ");
+
+ switch (smt_mitigations) {
+ case SMT_MITIGATIONS_OFF:
+ pr_cont("off\n");
+ break;
+ case SMT_MITIGATIONS_AUTO:
+ pr_cont("auto\n");
+ break;
+ case SMT_MITIGATIONS_ON:
+ pr_cont("on\n");
+ }
+}
+
void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
{
/*
@@ -207,6 +240,8 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+ cpu_print_attack_vectors();
+
/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-07-07 18:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-07-07 18:32 [PATCH v6 00/21] Attack vector controls (part 2) David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:32 ` [PATCH v6 01/21] Documentation/x86: Document new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-07-09 15:57 ` [PATCH v7 01/22] " David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:32 ` [PATCH v6 02/21] cpu: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-07-10 10:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-07-10 14:02 ` Kaplan, David
2025-07-10 15:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-07-10 15:22 ` Kaplan, David
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:32 ` [PATCH v6 03/21] x86/Kconfig: Add arch attack vector support David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:32 ` [PATCH v6 04/21] x86/bugs: Define attack vectors relevant for each bug David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 05/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for MDS David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 06/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for TAA David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 07/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for MMIO David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 08/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for RFDS David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 09/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SRBDS David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 10/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for GDS David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 11/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 12/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 13/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 14/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for BHI David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 15/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 16/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for L1TF David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 17/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SRSO David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 18/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for ITS David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 19/21] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for PTI David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` David Kaplan [this message]
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Print enabled attack vectors tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 21/21] cpu: Show attack vectors in sysfs David Kaplan
2025-07-09 18:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-07-09 15:58 ` [PATCH v7 19/22] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for TSA David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
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