From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: "Kaplan, David" <David.Kaplan@amd.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 02/21] cpu: Define attack vectors
Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2025 17:17:02 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250710151702.GCaG_Zbjo1sqZ6NB2g@fat_crate.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <LV3PR12MB9265E7C013D6BBA5E6FB586C9448A@LV3PR12MB9265.namprd12.prod.outlook.com>
On Thu, Jul 10, 2025 at 02:02:56PM +0000, Kaplan, David wrote:
> Interesting. I would suggest a comma instead, so you have things like
> "mitigations=auto,no_user_kernel". That's somewhat consistent with the
> existing 'auto,nosmt' option as well.
Ack, see below.
> Still you would have global options come first, and then the attack vector
> options. But since commas are already used to separate tokens, that seems
> cleaner to me.
>
> If you're going to edit the patch directly, just please remember to update
> the documentation file accordingly too.
Yeah, and the commit messages.
This is just the patche(es), I'll go over the commit messages too.
---
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst
index ee56e849616f..b4de16f5ec44 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ or more options to disable various attack vectors.
Format:
| ``mitigations=[global]``
- | ``mitigations=[global];[attack vectors]``
+ | ``mitigations=[global],[attack vectors]``
Global options:
@@ -166,17 +166,17 @@ the global option is not specified, it defaults to 'auto'. The global option
'off' is equivalent to disabling all attack vectors.
Examples:
- | ``mitigations=auto;no_user_kernel``
+ | ``mitigations=auto,no_user_kernel``
Enable all attack vectors except user-to-kernel. Partial cross-thread
mitigations.
- | ``mitigations=auto,nosmt;no_guest_host,no_guest_guest``
+ | ``mitigations=auto,nosmt,no_guest_host,no_guest_guest``
Enable all attack vectors and cross-thread mitigations except for
guest-to-host and guest-to-guest mitigations.
- | ``mitigations=;no_cross_thread``
+ | ``mitigations=,no_cross_thread``
Enable all attack vectors but not cross-thread mitigations.
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index be25543567c0..c976a6686d8b 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -3276,8 +3276,8 @@ static int __init mitigations_parse_cmdline(char *arg)
if (!*p)
return 0;
- /* Attack vector controls may come after a ';' */
- if (*p++ != ';' || !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CPU_ATTACK_VECTORS)) {
+ /* Attack vector controls may come after the ',' */
+ if (*p++ != ',' || !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CPU_ATTACK_VECTORS)) {
pr_crit("Unsupported mitigations=%s, system may still be vulnerable\n", arg);
return 0;
}
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-07-10 15:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-07-07 18:32 [PATCH v6 00/21] Attack vector controls (part 2) David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:32 ` [PATCH v6 01/21] Documentation/x86: Document new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-07-09 15:57 ` [PATCH v7 01/22] " David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:32 ` [PATCH v6 02/21] cpu: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-07-10 10:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-07-10 14:02 ` Kaplan, David
2025-07-10 15:17 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2025-07-10 15:22 ` Kaplan, David
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:32 ` [PATCH v6 03/21] x86/Kconfig: Add arch attack vector support David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:32 ` [PATCH v6 04/21] x86/bugs: Define attack vectors relevant for each bug David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 05/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for MDS David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 06/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for TAA David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 07/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for MMIO David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 08/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for RFDS David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 09/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SRBDS David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 10/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for GDS David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 11/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 12/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 13/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 14/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for BHI David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 15/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 16/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for L1TF David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 17/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SRSO David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 18/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for ITS David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 19/21] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for PTI David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 20/21] x86/bugs: Print enabled attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 21/21] cpu: Show attack vectors in sysfs David Kaplan
2025-07-09 18:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-07-09 15:58 ` [PATCH v7 19/22] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for TSA David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
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