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From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v6 21/21] cpu: Show attack vectors in sysfs
Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2025 13:33:16 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250707183316.1349127-22-david.kaplan@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250707183316.1349127-1-david.kaplan@amd.com>

Show the status of currently mitigated attack vectors in
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vector_mitigations/.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
 drivers/base/cpu.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 67 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c
index 7779ab0ca7ce..0b76213ea70e 100644
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <linux/tick.h>
 #include <linux/pm_qos.h>
 #include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/string_choices.h>
 #include <linux/sched/isolation.h>
 
 #include "base.h"
@@ -647,6 +648,70 @@ static const struct attribute_group cpu_root_vulnerabilities_group = {
 	.attrs = cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs,
 };
 
+static const char *attack_vector_state(enum cpu_attack_vectors v)
+{
+	return str_on_off(cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(v));
+}
+
+static ssize_t cpu_show_user_kernel_vector(struct device *dev,
+				struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n",  attack_vector_state(CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL));
+}
+
+static ssize_t cpu_show_user_user_vector(struct device *dev,
+				struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", attack_vector_state(CPU_MITIGATE_USER_USER));
+}
+
+static ssize_t cpu_show_guest_host_vector(struct device *dev,
+				struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", attack_vector_state(CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST));
+}
+
+static ssize_t cpu_show_guest_guest_vector(struct device *dev,
+				struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", attack_vector_state(CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_GUEST));
+}
+
+static ssize_t cpu_show_smt_vector(struct device *dev,
+				struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	switch (smt_mitigations) {
+	case SMT_MITIGATIONS_OFF:
+		return sysfs_emit(buf, "off\n");
+	case SMT_MITIGATIONS_ON:
+		return sysfs_emit(buf, "on\n");
+	case SMT_MITIGATIONS_AUTO:
+		return sysfs_emit(buf, "auto\n");
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static DEVICE_ATTR(user_kernel, 0444, cpu_show_user_kernel_vector, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(user_user, 0444, cpu_show_user_user_vector, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(guest_host, 0444, cpu_show_guest_host_vector, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(guest_guest, 0444, cpu_show_guest_guest_vector, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(smt, 0444, cpu_show_smt_vector, NULL);
+
+static struct attribute *cpu_vector_mitigations_attrs[] = {
+	&dev_attr_user_kernel.attr,
+	&dev_attr_user_user.attr,
+	&dev_attr_guest_host.attr,
+	&dev_attr_guest_guest.attr,
+	&dev_attr_smt.attr,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group cpu_vector_mitigations_group = {
+	.name  = "vector_mitigations",
+	.attrs = cpu_vector_mitigations_attrs,
+};
+
 static void __init cpu_register_vulnerabilities(void)
 {
 	struct device *dev = bus_get_dev_root(&cpu_subsys);
@@ -654,6 +719,8 @@ static void __init cpu_register_vulnerabilities(void)
 	if (dev) {
 		if (sysfs_create_group(&dev->kobj, &cpu_root_vulnerabilities_group))
 			pr_err("Unable to register CPU vulnerabilities\n");
+		if (sysfs_create_group(&dev->kobj, &cpu_vector_mitigations_group))
+			pr_err("Unable to register CPU attack vectors\n");
 		put_device(dev);
 	}
 }
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-07-07 18:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-07-07 18:32 [PATCH v6 00/21] Attack vector controls (part 2) David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:32 ` [PATCH v6 01/21] Documentation/x86: Document new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-07-09 15:57   ` [PATCH v7 01/22] " David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09     ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:32 ` [PATCH v6 02/21] cpu: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-07-10 10:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-07-10 14:02     ` Kaplan, David
2025-07-10 15:17       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-07-10 15:22         ` Kaplan, David
2025-07-11 16:09   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:32 ` [PATCH v6 03/21] x86/Kconfig: Add arch attack vector support David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:32 ` [PATCH v6 04/21] x86/bugs: Define attack vectors relevant for each bug David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 05/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for MDS David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 06/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for TAA David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 07/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for MMIO David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 08/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for RFDS David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 09/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SRBDS David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 10/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for GDS David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 11/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 12/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 13/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 14/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for BHI David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 15/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 16/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for L1TF David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 17/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SRSO David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 18/21] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for ITS David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 19/21] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for PTI David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` [PATCH v6 20/21] x86/bugs: Print enabled attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-07-07 18:33 ` David Kaplan [this message]
2025-07-09 18:47   ` [PATCH v6 21/21] cpu: Show attack vectors in sysfs Borislav Petkov
2025-07-09 15:58 ` [PATCH v7 19/22] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for TSA David Kaplan
2025-07-11 16:09   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan

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