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From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mlevitsk@redhat.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com,
	weijiang.yang@intel.com, xin@zytor.com,
	Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>,
	John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Subject: [PATCH v12 24/24] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CET states
Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2025 19:55:32 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250812025606.74625-25-chao.gao@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250812025606.74625-1-chao.gao@intel.com>

Introduce consistency checks for CET states during nested VM-entry.

A VMCS contains both guest and host CET states, each comprising the
IA32_S_CET MSR, SSP, and IA32_INTERRUPT_SSP_TABLE_ADDR MSR. Various
checks are applied to CET states during VM-entry as documented in SDM
Vol3 Chapter "VM ENTRIES". Implement all these checks during nested
VM-entry to emulate the architectural behavior.

In summary, there are three kinds of checks on guest/host CET states
during VM-entry:

A. Checks applied to both guest states and host states:

 * The IA32_S_CET field must not set any reserved bits; bits 10 (SUPPRESS)
   and 11 (TRACKER) cannot both be set.
 * SSP should not have bits 1:0 set.
 * The IA32_INTERRUPT_SSP_TABLE_ADDR field must be canonical.

B. Checks applied to host states only

 * IA32_S_CET MSR and SSP must be canonical if the CPU enters 64-bit mode
   after VM-exit. Otherwise, IA32_S_CET and SSP must have their higher 32
   bits cleared.

C. Checks applied to guest states only:

 * IA32_S_CET MSR and SSP are not required to be canonical (i.e., 63:N-1
   are identical, where N is the CPU's maximum linear-address width). But,
   bits 63:N of SSP must be identical.

Tested-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index 47e413e56764..7c88fedc27c7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -3104,6 +3104,17 @@ static bool is_l1_noncanonical_address_on_vmexit(u64 la, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
 	return !__is_canonical_address(la, l1_address_bits_on_exit);
 }
 
+static bool is_valid_cet_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 s_cet, u64 ssp, u64 ssp_tbl)
+{
+	if (!is_cet_msr_valid(vcpu, s_cet) || !IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 4))
+		return false;
+
+	if (is_noncanonical_msr_address(ssp_tbl, vcpu))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 static int nested_vmx_check_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				       struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
 {
@@ -3173,6 +3184,26 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 			return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE) {
+		if (CC(!is_valid_cet_state(vcpu, vmcs12->host_s_cet, vmcs12->host_ssp,
+					   vmcs12->host_ssp_tbl)))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		/*
+		 * IA32_S_CET and SSP must be canonical if the host will
+		 * enter 64-bit mode after VM-exit; otherwise, higher
+		 * 32-bits must be all 0s.
+		 */
+		if (ia32e) {
+			if (CC(is_noncanonical_msr_address(vmcs12->host_s_cet, vcpu)) ||
+			    CC(is_noncanonical_msr_address(vmcs12->host_ssp, vcpu)))
+				return -EINVAL;
+		} else {
+			if (CC(vmcs12->host_s_cet >> 32) || CC(vmcs12->host_ssp >> 32))
+				return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -3283,6 +3314,22 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	     CC((vmcs12->guest_bndcfgs & MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS_RSVD))))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE) {
+		if (CC(!is_valid_cet_state(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_s_cet, vmcs12->guest_ssp,
+					   vmcs12->guest_ssp_tbl)))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		/*
+		 * Guest SSP must have 63:N bits identical, rather than
+		 * be canonical (i.e., 63:N-1 bits identical), where N is
+		 * the CPU's maximum linear-address width. Similar to
+		 * is_noncanonical_msr_address(), use the host's
+		 * linear-address width.
+		 */
+		if (CC(!__is_canonical_address(vmcs12->guest_ssp, max_host_virt_addr_bits() + 1)))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	if (nested_check_guest_non_reg_state(vmcs12))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-- 
2.47.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-08-12  2:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-08-12  2:55 [PATCH v12 00/24] Enable CET Virtualization Chao Gao
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 01/24] KVM: x86: Rename kvm_{g,s}et_msr()* to show that they emulate guest accesses Chao Gao
2025-09-01  7:07   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-02 14:28     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 02/24] KVM: x86: Use double-underscore read/write MSR helpers as appropriate Chao Gao
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 03/24] KVM: x86: Add kvm_msr_{read,write}() helpers Chao Gao
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 04/24] KVM: x86: Manually clear MPX state only on INIT Chao Gao
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 05/24] KVM: x86: Zero XSTATE components on INIT by iterating over supported features Chao Gao
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 06/24] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG uAPIs support Chao Gao
2025-08-19 17:37   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-20  8:28     ` Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:20       ` Chao Gao
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 07/24] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Chao Gao
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 08/24] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Chao Gao
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 09/24] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Chao Gao
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 10/24] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Chao Gao
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 11/24] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Chao Gao
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 12/24] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Chao Gao
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 13/24] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Chao Gao
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 14/24] KVM: x86: Enable guest SSP read/write interface with new uAPIs Chao Gao
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 15/24] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Chao Gao
2025-08-19 16:09   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-19 17:19     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-08-19 17:50       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-19 17:53     ` Xin Li
2025-08-19 18:35       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-20  2:32     ` Chao Gao
2025-08-20 14:12       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 16/24] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Chao Gao
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 17/24] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Chao Gao
2025-08-19 16:11   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-19 18:05     ` Xin Li
2025-08-19 18:45       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-20  2:10         ` Chao Gao
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 18/24] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Chao Gao
2025-08-18  7:57   ` Chao Gao
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 19/24] KVM: x86: Don't emulate instructions guarded by CET Chao Gao
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 20/24] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Chao Gao
2025-08-19 18:49   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 21/24] KVM: nVMX: Virtualize NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC for L1 event injection to L2 Chao Gao
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 22/24] KVM: nVMX: Enable CET support for nested guest Chao Gao
2025-08-15 14:24   ` Chao Gao
2025-08-19 17:18   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-12  2:55 ` [PATCH v12 23/24] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CR0.WP and CR4.CET Chao Gao
2025-08-19 17:27   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-20  7:29     ` Chao Gao
2025-08-12  2:55 ` Chao Gao [this message]
2025-08-15 22:57 ` [PATCH v12 00/24] Enable CET Virtualization Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-08-18  7:53   ` Chao Gao
2025-08-18 22:25 ` Xin Li
2025-08-19 23:11 ` Sean Christopherson

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