From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
mlevitsk@redhat.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com,
weijiang.yang@intel.com, Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>,
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 15/24] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs
Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2025 11:35:15 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aKTD42Gma7qG3k9_@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <915d0ca8-05c5-42c1-90fe-b214904b23bc@zytor.com>
On Tue, Aug 19, 2025, Xin Li wrote:
> On 8/19/2025 9:09 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > + case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
> > > + if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> > > + return KVM_MSR_RET_UNSUPPORTED;
> > > + if (is_noncanonical_msr_address(data, vcpu))
> > This emulation is wrong (in no small part because the architecture sucks). From
> > the SDM:
> >
> > If the processor does not support Intel 64 architecture, these fields have only
> > 32 bits; bits 63:32 of the MSRs are reserved.
> >
> > On processors that support Intel 64 architecture this value cannot represent a
> > non-canonical address.
> >
> > In protected mode, only 31:0 are loaded.
> >
> > That means KVM needs to drop bits 63:32 if the vCPU doesn't have LM or if the vCPU
> > isn't in 64-bit mode. The last one is especially frustrating, because software
> > can still get a 64-bit value into the MSRs while running in protected, e.g. by
> > switching to 64-bit mode, doing WRMSRs, then switching back to 32-bit mode.
> >
> > But, there's probably no point in actually trying to correctly emulate/virtualize
> > the Protected Mode behavior, because the MSRs can be written via XRSTOR, and to
> > close that hole KVM would need to trap-and-emulate XRSTOR. No thanks.
> >
> > Unless someone has a better idea, I'm inclined to take an erratum for this, i.e.
> > just sweep it under the rug.
>
> Since WRMSR (WRMSRNS) and XRSTORS are the two instructions that write to
> MSRs in CPL0, Why KVM doesn't use the XSS-exiting bitmap?
Intercepting XRSTORS would introduce (likely) unacceptable performance overhead
if a guest actually used CET in PM, I have zero desire to try and proxy/emulate
XRSTORS from guest memory in KVM, and CET already has big gaping virtualization
holes.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-08-19 18:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-08-12 2:55 [PATCH v12 00/24] Enable CET Virtualization Chao Gao
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 01/24] KVM: x86: Rename kvm_{g,s}et_msr()* to show that they emulate guest accesses Chao Gao
2025-09-01 7:07 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-02 14:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 02/24] KVM: x86: Use double-underscore read/write MSR helpers as appropriate Chao Gao
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 03/24] KVM: x86: Add kvm_msr_{read,write}() helpers Chao Gao
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 04/24] KVM: x86: Manually clear MPX state only on INIT Chao Gao
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 05/24] KVM: x86: Zero XSTATE components on INIT by iterating over supported features Chao Gao
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 06/24] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG uAPIs support Chao Gao
2025-08-19 17:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-20 8:28 ` Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:20 ` Chao Gao
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 07/24] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Chao Gao
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 08/24] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Chao Gao
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 09/24] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Chao Gao
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 10/24] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Chao Gao
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 11/24] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Chao Gao
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 12/24] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Chao Gao
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 13/24] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Chao Gao
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 14/24] KVM: x86: Enable guest SSP read/write interface with new uAPIs Chao Gao
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 15/24] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Chao Gao
2025-08-19 16:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-19 17:19 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-08-19 17:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-19 17:53 ` Xin Li
2025-08-19 18:35 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-08-20 2:32 ` Chao Gao
2025-08-20 14:12 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 16/24] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Chao Gao
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 17/24] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Chao Gao
2025-08-19 16:11 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-19 18:05 ` Xin Li
2025-08-19 18:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-20 2:10 ` Chao Gao
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 18/24] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Chao Gao
2025-08-18 7:57 ` Chao Gao
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 19/24] KVM: x86: Don't emulate instructions guarded by CET Chao Gao
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 20/24] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Chao Gao
2025-08-19 18:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 21/24] KVM: nVMX: Virtualize NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC for L1 event injection to L2 Chao Gao
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 22/24] KVM: nVMX: Enable CET support for nested guest Chao Gao
2025-08-15 14:24 ` Chao Gao
2025-08-19 17:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 23/24] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CR0.WP and CR4.CET Chao Gao
2025-08-19 17:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-20 7:29 ` Chao Gao
2025-08-12 2:55 ` [PATCH v12 24/24] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CET states Chao Gao
2025-08-15 22:57 ` [PATCH v12 00/24] Enable CET Virtualization Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-08-18 7:53 ` Chao Gao
2025-08-18 22:25 ` Xin Li
2025-08-19 23:11 ` Sean Christopherson
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=aKTD42Gma7qG3k9_@google.com \
--to=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=chao.gao@intel.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=john.allen@amd.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=minipli@grsecurity.net \
--cc=mlevitsk@redhat.com \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=weijiang.yang@intel.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
--cc=xin@zytor.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®