From: Richard Patel <ripatel@wii.dev>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 0/7] Usermode Indirect Branch Tracking
Date: Sun, 17 May 2026 13:30:17 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260517183024.16292-1-ripatel@wii.dev> (raw)
I was quite surprised that the Linux kernel still does not allow
userspace to enable x86 IBT (indirect jmp/call integrity).
Compilers and linkers have been emitting 'endbr64' IBT markers and ELF
support notes for a while now.
The hard work was done years ago by Intel:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210830182221.3535-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com/
In summary, usermode IBT requires 3 things:
1. Set the CET_ENDBR_EN bit in MSR_IA32_U_CET for each IBT-enabled thread
(PATCH 2,5)
2. Back up the WAIT_FOR_ENDBR bit across signal handling (PATCH 3,4)
3. Provide a way for usermode to enable it (PATCH 5)
This builds on top of Yu Cheng's work, with some adaptations:
- FRED support
- Implemented the existing prctl(PR_CFI_*) API
- Removed ELF parsing (can be added later)
Unresolved questions:
- Is there a cleaner way to do the WAIT_FOR_ENDBR XSAVE fallback?
- What to do about 'notrack jmp *rax'?
I leave CET_NO_TRACK_EN enabled, which weakens IBT, by enabling a jump
prefix that skips the ENDBR check. GCC emits it for jump tables
(-mcet-switch). We could introduce a PR_CFI_IBT_STRICT bit.
- There's some obvious overlap with arch_prctl(ARCH_SHSTK_*).
Happy to use that API instead.
Richard Patel (7):
x86: add userspace IBT config option
x86: shstk: don't clobber IBT bits in U_CET MSR
x86: signal handler support for IBT
x86: ban 32-bit sigreturn when user IBT enabled
x86: expose user IBT via PR_CFI_BRANCH_LANDING_PADS
x86/entry/vdso: build with IBT support
selftests/x86: test usermode IBT
arch/x86/Kconfig | 17 ++
arch/x86/entry/vdso/common/Makefile.include | 3 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/ibt.h | 16 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ucontext.h | 5 +
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 3 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 14 +-
arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c | 175 ++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 2 +
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 12 +-
arch/x86/kernel/signal_32.c | 5 +
arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c | 6 +
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile | 5 +-
tools/testing/selftests/x86/user_ibt.c | 157 ++++++++++++++++++
17 files changed, 420 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/user_ibt.c
--
2.47.3
next reply other threads:[~2026-05-17 18:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-17 18:30 Richard Patel [this message]
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86: add userspace IBT config option Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86: shstk: don't clobber IBT bits in U_CET MSR Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 3/7] x86: signal handler support for IBT Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 4/7] x86: ban 32-bit sigreturn when user IBT enabled Richard Patel
2026-05-18 20:22 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-05-19 0:14 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-24 21:53 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-25 11:05 ` David Laight
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 5/7] x86: expose user IBT via PR_CFI_BRANCH_LANDING_PADS Richard Patel
2026-05-18 6:46 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 6/7] x86/entry/vdso: build with IBT support Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 7/7] selftests/x86: test usermode IBT Richard Patel
2026-05-18 7:36 ` [PATCH 0/7] Usermode Indirect Branch Tracking Peter Zijlstra
2026-05-18 16:25 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-18 19:31 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-05-19 9:33 ` David Laight
2026-05-19 9:40 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-05-19 13:14 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-19 13:28 ` David Laight
2026-05-19 14:18 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-19 14:42 ` Peter Zijlstra
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