From: Richard Patel <ripatel@wii.dev>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 3/7] x86: signal handler support for IBT
Date: Sun, 17 May 2026 13:30:20 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260517183024.16292-4-ripatel@wii.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260517183024.16292-1-ripatel@wii.dev>
Addresses an edge case in usermode IBT with signal handlers.
When entering and exiting signals, the WAIT_FOR_ENDBR CPU state
must be restored. WAIT_FOR_ENDBR is a flag that raises a CET
violation if the next instruction is not endbr64.
If a thread enters a signal handler immediately after executing an
indirect jump (before reaching an endbr64), the WAIT_FOR_ENDBR
would otherwise mistakenly cause a CET violation on the signal
handler's first instruction.
Worse, an attacker could circumvent IBT by triggering a signal
before a vulnerable jump, call rt_sigreturn in that signal, and
then return to the original indirect jump target without endbr64
checking.
Unless FRED is enabled, the WAIT_FOR_ENDBR flag is backed up
from the U_CET MSR. Due to XSAVE, this MSR might be stale in
kernel-mode.
A gap in 32-bit signal handling is resolved in a follow-up commit.
Based-on-patch-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210820182245.1188-4-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Richard Patel <ripatel@wii.dev>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/ibt.h | 14 +++++
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 ++
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ucontext.h | 5 ++
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c | 6 ++
6 files changed, 119 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/ibt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/ibt.h
index 5e45d6424722..3fe464bf83e7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/ibt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/ibt.h
@@ -114,4 +114,18 @@ static inline void ibt_restore(u64 save) { }
#define ENDBR_INSN_SIZE (4*HAS_KERNEL_IBT)
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
+
+struct pt_regs;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_IBT
+bool user_ibt_pop_wait_endbr(struct pt_regs *regs);
+void user_ibt_restore_wait_endbr(struct pt_regs *regs, bool wait_endbr);
+#else
+static inline bool user_ibt_pop_wait_endbr(struct pt_regs *regs) { return false; }
+static inline void user_ibt_restore_wait_endbr(struct pt_regs *regs, bool wait_endbr) {}
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_USER_IBT */
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_IBT_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 10b5355b323e..6ce8f7b6607c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -504,6 +504,11 @@ struct thread_struct {
unsigned int iopl_warn:1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_IBT
+ unsigned int ibt:1;
+ unsigned int ibt_locked:1;
+#endif
+
/*
* Protection Keys Register for Userspace. Loaded immediately on
* context switch. Store it in thread_struct to avoid a lookup in
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ucontext.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ucontext.h
index 5657b7a49f03..0271f5e8aa14 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ucontext.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ucontext.h
@@ -51,6 +51,11 @@
#define UC_STRICT_RESTORE_SS 0x4
#endif
+/*
+ * Indicates IBT status WAIT_FOR_ENDBR.
+ */
+#define UC_WAIT_ENDBR 0x8
+
#include <asm-generic/ucontext.h>
#endif /* _ASM_X86_UCONTEXT_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 47a32f583930..05c87f014552 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CALL_THUNKS) += callthunks.o
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CET) += cet.o
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK) += shstk.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_USER_IBT) += ibt.o
###
# 64 bit specific files
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..596b0629106d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
+
+static bool user_ibt_enabled(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ return task->thread.ibt;
+}
+
+bool user_ibt_pop_wait_endbr(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ struct fpu *fpu = x86_task_fpu(current);
+ u64 msrval = 0;
+
+ if (!user_ibt_enabled(current))
+ return 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_FRED
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {
+ msrval = regs->fred_cs.wfe;
+ regs->fred_cs.wfe = 0;
+ return !!msrval;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ fpregs_lock();
+
+ if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD)) {
+ if (!rdmsrq_safe(MSR_IA32_U_CET, &msrval))
+ wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msrval & ~CET_WAIT_ENDBR);
+ } else {
+ struct cet_user_state *cet;
+
+ /*
+ * If TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD and get_xsave_addr() returns zero,
+ * XFEATURE_CET_USER is in init state (cet is not active).
+ * Return zero status.
+ */
+ cet = get_xsave_addr(&fpu->fpstate->regs.xsave,
+ XFEATURE_CET_USER);
+ if (cet) {
+ msrval = cet->user_cet;
+ cet->user_cet = msrval & ~CET_WAIT_ENDBR;
+ }
+ }
+
+ fpregs_unlock();
+
+ return !!(msrval & CET_WAIT_ENDBR);
+}
+
+void
+user_ibt_restore_wait_endbr(struct pt_regs *regs, bool wait_endbr)
+{
+ struct fpu *fpu = x86_task_fpu(current);
+ u64 msrval = 0;
+
+ if (!user_ibt_enabled(current))
+ return;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_FRED
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {
+ regs->fred_cs.wfe = wait_endbr;
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (!wait_endbr)
+ return;
+
+ fpregs_lock();
+
+ if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD)) {
+ if (!rdmsrq_safe(MSR_IA32_U_CET, &msrval))
+ wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msrval | CET_WAIT_ENDBR);
+ } else {
+ struct cet_user_state *cet;
+
+ cet = get_xsave_addr(&fpu->fpstate->regs.xsave,
+ XFEATURE_CET_USER);
+ if (cet)
+ cet->user_cet |= CET_WAIT_ENDBR;
+ }
+
+ fpregs_unlock();
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c
index d483b585c6c6..9f1861540d27 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <asm/ucontext.h>
#include <asm/fpu/signal.h>
+#include <asm/ibt.h>
#include <asm/sighandling.h>
#include <asm/syscall.h>
@@ -92,6 +93,8 @@ static bool restore_sigcontext(struct pt_regs *regs,
if (unlikely(!(uc_flags & UC_STRICT_RESTORE_SS) && user_64bit_mode(regs)))
force_valid_ss(regs);
+ user_ibt_restore_wait_endbr(regs, uc_flags & UC_WAIT_ENDBR);
+
return fpu__restore_sig((void __user *)sc.fpstate, 0);
}
@@ -158,6 +161,9 @@ static unsigned long frame_uc_flags(struct pt_regs *regs)
if (likely(user_64bit_mode(regs)))
flags |= UC_STRICT_RESTORE_SS;
+ if (user_ibt_pop_wait_endbr(regs))
+ flags |= UC_WAIT_ENDBR;
+
return flags;
}
--
2.47.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-17 18:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-17 18:30 [PATCH 0/7] Usermode Indirect Branch Tracking Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86: add userspace IBT config option Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86: shstk: don't clobber IBT bits in U_CET MSR Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` Richard Patel [this message]
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 4/7] x86: ban 32-bit sigreturn when user IBT enabled Richard Patel
2026-05-18 20:22 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-05-19 0:14 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-24 21:53 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-25 11:05 ` David Laight
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 5/7] x86: expose user IBT via PR_CFI_BRANCH_LANDING_PADS Richard Patel
2026-05-18 6:46 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 6/7] x86/entry/vdso: build with IBT support Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 7/7] selftests/x86: test usermode IBT Richard Patel
2026-05-18 7:36 ` [PATCH 0/7] Usermode Indirect Branch Tracking Peter Zijlstra
2026-05-18 16:25 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-18 19:31 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-05-19 9:33 ` David Laight
2026-05-19 9:40 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-05-19 13:14 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-19 13:28 ` David Laight
2026-05-19 14:18 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-19 14:42 ` Peter Zijlstra
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