From: Richard Patel <ripatel@wii.dev>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 1/7] x86: add userspace IBT config option
Date: Sun, 17 May 2026 13:30:18 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260517183024.16292-2-ripatel@wii.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260517183024.16292-1-ripatel@wii.dev>
Adds a X86_USER_IBT Kconfig option and "nouseribt" command-line
option. Default disabled for now.
These prepare for userspace support for IBT (forward-edge control
flow integrity protection).
User IBT works even if kernel IBT is disabled. However, ibt=off
also disables user IBT.
Signed-off-by: Richard Patel <ripatel@wii.dev>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 17 +++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
5 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index f3f7cb01d69d..12cc944b63c7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1901,6 +1901,23 @@ config X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
If unsure, say N.
+config X86_USER_IBT
+ bool "X86 userspace indirect branch tracking"
+ depends on X86_64
+ select X86_CET
+ help
+ Support Indirect Branch Tracking protection for userspace
+ applications. IBT is a hardware-supported coarse-grained
+ forward-edge Control Flow Integrity protection feature.
+ It enforces that all indirect calls must land on an ENDBR
+ instruction. Applications must be enabled to use it, and old
+ userspace does not get protection "for free". Enables the
+ PR_CFI_BRANCH_LANDING_PADS prctl CFI option.
+
+ CPUs supporting IBT were first released in 2021.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
+
config INTEL_TDX_HOST
bool "Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) host support"
depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 1d506e5d6f46..1825cbf864c0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -516,6 +516,7 @@
* and purposes if CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM is set).
*/
#define X86_FEATURE_X2AVIC_EXT (21*32+20) /* AMD SVM x2AVIC support for 4k vCPUs */
+#define X86_FEATURE_USER_IBT (21*32+21) /* Indirect Branch Tracking for user mode applications */
/*
* BUG word(s)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
index 99444409c026..3ccf47e82da1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
@@ -149,7 +149,8 @@ __setup("ibt=", ibt_setup);
DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_control_protection)
{
if (user_mode(regs)) {
- if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK) ||
+ cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_IBT))
do_user_cp_fault(regs, error_code);
else
do_unexpected_cp(regs, error_code);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index a4268c47f2bc..2839edd92331 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ __noendbr void ibt_restore(u64 save)
static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
- bool user_shstk, kernel_ibt;
+ bool user_shstk, kernel_ibt, user_ibt;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_CET))
return;
@@ -642,13 +642,19 @@ static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
kernel_ibt = HAS_KERNEL_IBT && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
user_shstk = cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK);
+ /* User IBT only needs hardware IBT, not kernel-enabled IBT. */
+ user_ibt = cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBT) &&
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_USER_IBT);
- if (!kernel_ibt && !user_shstk)
+ if (!kernel_ibt && !user_shstk && !user_ibt)
return;
if (user_shstk)
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK);
+ if (user_ibt)
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_USER_IBT);
+
if (kernel_ibt)
wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_S_CET, CET_ENDBR_EN);
else
@@ -666,6 +672,7 @@ static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
__noendbr void cet_disable(void)
{
if (!(cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT) ||
+ cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_IBT) ||
cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)))
return;
@@ -1760,6 +1767,9 @@ static void __init cpu_parse_early_param(void)
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nousershstk"))
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK);
+ if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nouseribt"))
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USER_IBT);
+
/* Minimize the gap between FRED is available and available but disabled. */
arglen = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "fred", arg, sizeof(arg));
if (arglen == 3 && !strncmp(arg, "off", 3))
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 86d17b195e79..1cf22d27c7a1 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -515,6 +515,7 @@
* and purposes if CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM is set).
*/
#define X86_FEATURE_X2AVIC_EXT (21*32+20) /* AMD SVM x2AVIC support for 4k vCPUs */
+#define X86_FEATURE_USER_IBT (21*32+21) /* Indirect Branch Tracking for user mode applications */
/*
* BUG word(s)
--
2.47.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-17 18:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-17 18:30 [PATCH 0/7] Usermode Indirect Branch Tracking Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` Richard Patel [this message]
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86: shstk: don't clobber IBT bits in U_CET MSR Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 3/7] x86: signal handler support for IBT Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 4/7] x86: ban 32-bit sigreturn when user IBT enabled Richard Patel
2026-05-18 20:22 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-05-19 0:14 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-24 21:53 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-25 11:05 ` David Laight
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 5/7] x86: expose user IBT via PR_CFI_BRANCH_LANDING_PADS Richard Patel
2026-05-18 6:46 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 6/7] x86/entry/vdso: build with IBT support Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 7/7] selftests/x86: test usermode IBT Richard Patel
2026-05-18 7:36 ` [PATCH 0/7] Usermode Indirect Branch Tracking Peter Zijlstra
2026-05-18 16:25 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-18 19:31 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-05-19 9:33 ` David Laight
2026-05-19 9:40 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-05-19 13:14 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-19 13:28 ` David Laight
2026-05-19 14:18 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-19 14:42 ` Peter Zijlstra
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