From: Richard Patel <ripatel@wii.dev>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 5/7] x86: expose user IBT via PR_CFI_BRANCH_LANDING_PADS
Date: Sun, 17 May 2026 13:30:22 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260517183024.16292-6-ripatel@wii.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260517183024.16292-1-ripatel@wii.dev>
Allows userspace applications to enable IBT (forward-edge control
flow integrity protection) using the portable PR_CFI prctl API.
The name 'branch landing pads' is RISC-V specific, but the mechanism
is nearly identical in x86.
This setting enables the following MSR_IA32_U_CET bits:
- CET_ENDBR_EN (enforce endbr as indirect branch target)
- CET_NOTRACK_EN (jump modifier to opt-out of IBT checking)
Kernel-mode IBT (as part of CFI) bans notrack. A future prctl flag
could be introduced to ban notrack in usermode too.
Signed-off-by: Richard Patel <ripatel@wii.dev>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/ibt.h | 2 +
arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 2 +
3 files changed, 91 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/ibt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/ibt.h
index 3fe464bf83e7..a67c9ceaaf9e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/ibt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/ibt.h
@@ -121,9 +121,11 @@ struct pt_regs;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_IBT
bool user_ibt_pop_wait_endbr(struct pt_regs *regs);
void user_ibt_restore_wait_endbr(struct pt_regs *regs, bool wait_endbr);
+void reset_thread_ibt(void);
#else
static inline bool user_ibt_pop_wait_endbr(struct pt_regs *regs) { return false; }
static inline void user_ibt_restore_wait_endbr(struct pt_regs *regs, bool wait_endbr) {}
+static inline void reset_thread_ibt(void) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_USER_IBT */
#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c
index 596b0629106d..343e6fd5dab0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
@@ -9,6 +11,85 @@ static bool user_ibt_enabled(struct task_struct *task)
return task->thread.ibt;
}
+static bool user_ibt_locked(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ return task->thread.ibt_locked;
+}
+
+static void user_ibt_set_lock(struct task_struct *task, bool lock)
+{
+ task->thread.ibt_locked = lock;
+}
+
+static void user_ibt_set_enable(bool enable)
+{
+ u64 msrval;
+
+ /* Already enabled */
+ if (user_ibt_enabled(current) == enable)
+ return;
+
+ current->thread.ibt = !!enable;
+
+ fpregs_lock_and_load();
+ rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msrval);
+ if (enable)
+ msrval |= CET_ENDBR_EN | CET_NO_TRACK_EN;
+ else
+ msrval &= ~(CET_ENDBR_EN | CET_NO_TRACK_EN);
+ msrval &= ~CET_WAIT_ENDBR;
+ wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msrval);
+ fpregs_unlock();
+}
+
+int arch_prctl_get_branch_landing_pad_state(struct task_struct *t,
+ unsigned long __user *state)
+{
+ unsigned long status = 0;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_IBT) || in_ia32_syscall())
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ status = (user_ibt_enabled(t) ? PR_CFI_ENABLE : PR_CFI_DISABLE);
+ status |= (user_ibt_locked(t) ? PR_CFI_LOCK : 0);
+
+ return copy_to_user(state, &status, sizeof(status)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
+}
+
+int arch_prctl_set_branch_landing_pad_state(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long state)
+{
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_IBT) || in_ia32_syscall())
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (t != current)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (user_ibt_locked(t))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!(state & (PR_CFI_ENABLE | PR_CFI_DISABLE)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (state & PR_CFI_ENABLE && state & PR_CFI_DISABLE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ user_ibt_set_enable(!!(state & PR_CFI_ENABLE));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int arch_prctl_lock_branch_landing_pad_state(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_IBT) ||
+ !user_ibt_enabled(task) ||
+ in_ia32_syscall())
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ user_ibt_set_lock(task, true);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
bool user_ibt_pop_wait_endbr(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct fpu *fpu = x86_task_fpu(current);
@@ -86,3 +167,9 @@ user_ibt_restore_wait_endbr(struct pt_regs *regs, bool wait_endbr)
fpregs_unlock();
}
+
+void reset_thread_ibt(void)
+{
+ current->thread.ibt = false;
+ current->thread.ibt_locked = false;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index b85e715ebb30..4b727cc7bccb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
#include <asm/fsgsbase.h>
#include <asm/fred.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/ibt.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
/* Not included via unistd.h */
#include <asm/unistd_32_ia32.h>
@@ -540,6 +541,7 @@ start_thread_common(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long new_ip,
}
reset_thread_features();
+ reset_thread_ibt();
loadsegment(fs, 0);
loadsegment(es, _ds);
--
2.47.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-17 18:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-17 18:30 [PATCH 0/7] Usermode Indirect Branch Tracking Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86: add userspace IBT config option Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86: shstk: don't clobber IBT bits in U_CET MSR Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 3/7] x86: signal handler support for IBT Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 4/7] x86: ban 32-bit sigreturn when user IBT enabled Richard Patel
2026-05-18 20:22 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-05-19 0:14 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-24 21:53 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-25 11:05 ` David Laight
2026-05-17 18:30 ` Richard Patel [this message]
2026-05-18 6:46 ` [PATCH 5/7] x86: expose user IBT via PR_CFI_BRANCH_LANDING_PADS Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 6/7] x86/entry/vdso: build with IBT support Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 7/7] selftests/x86: test usermode IBT Richard Patel
2026-05-18 7:36 ` [PATCH 0/7] Usermode Indirect Branch Tracking Peter Zijlstra
2026-05-18 16:25 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-18 19:31 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-05-19 9:33 ` David Laight
2026-05-19 9:40 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-05-19 13:14 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-19 13:28 ` David Laight
2026-05-19 14:18 ` Richard Patel
2026-05-19 14:42 ` Peter Zijlstra
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