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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>, "bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "Gao, Chao" <chao.gao@intel.com>,
	"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	"luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com"
	<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"nik.borisov@suse.com" <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
	"bhe@redhat.com" <bhe@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec
Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2024 08:40:05 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5e7c3d98-9c95-4f74-b340-15ac4d9f3a50@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1b38a2a9a7cf2068d7e0a5154111147ba58dc99d.camel@intel.com>

On 2/19/24 20:57, Huang, Kai wrote:
> On Mon, 2024-02-19 at 16:09 -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> On 2/19/24 14:32, Borislav Petkov wrote:
>>> On Mon, Feb 19, 2024 at 01:45:37PM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>>> This change won't return the correct answer. The check needs to remain
>>>> against the sev_status value.
>>>
>>> Feel free to explain because this patch is confusing me.
>>
>> In your previous email, you want to put the CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT
>> case statement with the CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT case which is returning
>> sme_me_mask. That will be zero/false if SME is not active, skipping the
>> WBINVD. But, in reality you still need to perform the WBINVD in case the
>> kexec target is doing mem_encrypt=on.
>>
>> That's why the '!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED)' works here.
>> Basically, if you are bare-metal, it will return true. And it will only
>> return true for machines that support SME and have the
>> MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT bit set in SYS_CFG MSR because of where the
>> 'cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_AMD' assignment is.
>>
> 
> [...]
> 
>> However, if you move the
>> 'cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_AMD' to before the if statement, then you will have
>> the WBINVD called for any machine that supports SME, even if SME is not
>> possible because the proper bit in the SYS_CFG MSR hasn't been set.
> 
> Hi Tom,
> 
> Thanks for clarifying.  However it seems to me that this is the behaviour in the
> current upstream code.  The stop_this_cpu() checks CPUID directly w/o checking
> the SYS_CFG MSR:

Correct, it will match the upstream behavior this way. It would have been 
improved slightly with your original patch by avoiding the WBINVD if the 
MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT wasn't set.

> 
>          if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000001f &&
> 			(cpuid_eax(0x8000001f) & BIT(0)))
>                  native_wbinvd();
> 
> I believe the BIT(0) in CPUID, which is "Secure Memory Encryption Support", will
> always be true regardless of whether the MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT is set in
> SYS_CFG MSR?
> 
> If so, IIUC moving the 'cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_AMD' to the place right before the
> if statement as suggested by Boris seems just follows the current behaviour in
> the upstream code.

Yep, that's how I see it, too.

Thanks,
Tom

> 
> Of course we need to always return true for CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT but not
> querying sme_me_mask.
> 
>>
>> I know what I'm trying to say, let me know if it is making sense...
>>
>>>
>>>>> So you can't put it before the if - just slap it in both branches. Geez!
>>>>
>>>> I think that will still work because sme_me_mask and sev_status will both be
>>>> 0 on bare-metal if 'msr & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT' doesn't evaluate to
>>>> true. However, that will cause any platform that hasn't enabled memory
>>>> encryption (see SYS_CFG MSR), to also perform the WBINVD.
>>>
>>> If it keeps the code simpler I don't mind. That's so not a fast path.
>>>
>>>> That won't work, because the current system may not have SME active. The
>>>> cases that needs to be caught are kexec'ing from a mem_encrypt=off to a
>>>> mem_encrypt=on or from a mem_encrypt=on to a mem_encrypt=off.
>>>
>>> And I'm saying, we should keep it simple and simply WBINVD on SME
>>> capable machines, regardless of the encryption setting.
>>
>> In that case, CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT needs to be separate from
>> CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT as the original patch has it. The comment might make
>> more sense as:
>>
>> 	 * CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT represents whether SME is possible
>> 	 * on the platform, regardless of whether mem_encrypt=on has been
>> 	 * used to make SME active.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Tom
> 
> This looks good to me.  Thanks!
> 
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2024-02-20 14:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-01-31 11:31 [PATCH 0/4] TDX host: kexec() support Huang, Kai
2024-01-31 11:31 ` [PATCH 1/4] x86/coco: Add a new CC attribute to unify cache flush during kexec Huang, Kai
2024-02-19 16:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-19 19:45     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-02-19 20:32       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-19 22:09         ` Tom Lendacky
2024-02-20  2:57           ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-20 14:40             ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2024-02-20 14:28           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-20 14:47             ` Tom Lendacky
2024-02-20 20:07               ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-20 22:30                 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-02-21  1:38                   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-21  9:28                   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-22 11:49                     ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-23  3:13                       ` Dave Young
2024-02-23 10:41                     ` Dave Young
2024-02-28  2:54                       ` Dave Young
2024-02-28  9:21                         ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28 11:02                           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-28 22:21                             ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28 10:44                         ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-20  3:12     ` Huang, Kai
2024-01-31 11:31 ` [PATCH 2/4] x86/virt/tdx: Advertise the CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_INCOHERENT for TDX host Huang, Kai
2024-01-31 17:11   ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-01 14:42     ` Huang, Kai
2024-01-31 11:31 ` [PATCH 3/4] x86/kexec(): Reset TDX private memory on platforms with TDX erratum Huang, Kai
2024-01-31 21:21   ` Dave Hansen
2024-01-31 22:03     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-02-01 14:22       ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-01 14:39         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-02-01 14:47           ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-01 16:57           ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-05  6:49             ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-01 14:35     ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-02  0:54   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-05  6:44     ` Huang, Kai
2024-01-31 11:31 ` [PATCH 4/4] x86/virt/tdx: Remove the !KEXEC_CORE dependency Huang, Kai
2024-02-01 18:28 ` [PATCH 0/4] TDX host: kexec() support Tom Lendacky
2024-02-05  6:50   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-06 18:56     ` Kalra, Ashish
2024-02-07  1:43       ` Huang, Kai

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