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* [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
@ 2026-11-13 19:55 Gregory Price (Meta)
  2026-11-13 19:57 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
                   ` (2 more replies)
  0 siblings, 3 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Gregory Price (Meta) @ 2026-11-13 19:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-mm
  Cc: linux-kernel, kernel-team, jgg, leon, akpm, david, kas,
	dave.hansen, bp, rppt, stable, Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)

HMM can grant ordinary device write access to a userspace shadow stack.
On x86, pte_write() is true for a shadow-stack PTE, so a populated page
can be returned with HMM_PFN_WRITE without taking a CPU write fault.

Nouveau translates that flag into a writable GPU mapping.

Reject shadow-stack VMAs in hmm_vma_walk_test(). Use the existing
unsupported-range handling: a requested fault returns -EFAULT, while a
snapshot records HMM_PFN_ERROR.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20261111-mason-migrate-et-al-fixes-v1-10-3d2454362e8d@kernel.org/
Fixes: 54007f818206 ("mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)" <ljs@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Gregory Price (Meta) <gourry@gourry.net>
---
 mm/hmm.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/mm/hmm.c b/mm/hmm.c
index 2f1e98c6b644..fa61ca59d927 100644
--- a/mm/hmm.c
+++ b/mm/hmm.c
@@ -596,6 +596,7 @@ static int hmm_vma_walk_test(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma = walk->vma;
 
 	if (!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP)) &&
+	    !vma_test_single_mask(vma, VMA_SHADOW_STACK) &&
 	    vma->vm_flags & VM_READ)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -607,6 +608,8 @@ static int hmm_vma_walk_test(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
 	 * allow write access either. HMM does not support architectures that
 	 * allow write without read.
 	 *
+	 * Devices must not gain ordinary write access to shadow stacks.
+	 *
 	 * If a fault is requested for an unsupported range then it is a hard
 	 * failure.
 	 */
-- 
2.56.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
  2026-11-13 19:55 [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings Gregory Price (Meta)
@ 2026-11-13 19:57 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
  2026-11-13 20:15   ` Gregory Price (Meta)
  2026-11-13 20:03 ` Jason Gunthorpe
  2026-11-13 20:03 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
  2 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) @ 2026-11-13 19:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Gregory Price (Meta)
  Cc: linux-mm, linux-kernel, kernel-team, jgg, leon, akpm, david, kas,
	dave.hansen, bp, rppt, stable

On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 02:55:36PM -0500, Gregory Price (Meta) wrote:
> HMM can grant ordinary device write access to a userspace shadow stack.
> On x86, pte_write() is true for a shadow-stack PTE, so a populated page
> can be returned with HMM_PFN_WRITE without taking a CPU write fault.
>
> Nouveau translates that flag into a writable GPU mapping.
>
> Reject shadow-stack VMAs in hmm_vma_walk_test(). Use the existing
> unsupported-range handling: a requested fault returns -EFAULT, while a
> snapshot records HMM_PFN_ERROR.
>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20261111-mason-migrate-et-al-fixes-v1-10-3d2454362e8d@kernel.org/
> Fixes: 54007f818206 ("mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: "Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)" <ljs@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Gregory Price (Meta) <gourry@gourry.net>

Thanks for doing the HMM side of this, LGTM and:

Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs@kernel.org>

> ---
>  mm/hmm.c | 3 +++
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/mm/hmm.c b/mm/hmm.c
> index 2f1e98c6b644..fa61ca59d927 100644
> --- a/mm/hmm.c
> +++ b/mm/hmm.c
> @@ -596,6 +596,7 @@ static int hmm_vma_walk_test(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
>  	struct vm_area_struct *vma = walk->vma;
>
>  	if (!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP)) &&
> +	    !vma_test_single_mask(vma, VMA_SHADOW_STACK) &&
>  	    vma->vm_flags & VM_READ)
>  		return 0;
>
> @@ -607,6 +608,8 @@ static int hmm_vma_walk_test(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
>  	 * allow write access either. HMM does not support architectures that
>  	 * allow write without read.
>  	 *
> +	 * Devices must not gain ordinary write access to shadow stacks.
> +	 *
>  	 * If a fault is requested for an unsupported range then it is a hard
>  	 * failure.
>  	 */
> --
> 2.56.0
>

--
Cheers, Lorenzo

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
  2026-11-13 19:55 [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings Gregory Price (Meta)
  2026-11-13 19:57 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
  2026-11-13 20:03 ` Jason Gunthorpe
@ 2026-11-13 20:03 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
  2026-11-13 20:42   ` Gregory Price (Meta)
  2 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: David Hildenbrand (Arm) @ 2026-11-13 20:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Gregory Price (Meta), linux-mm
  Cc: linux-kernel, kernel-team, jgg, leon, akpm, kas, dave.hansen, bp,
	rppt, stable, Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)

On 11/13/26 20:55, Gregory Price (Meta) wrote:
> HMM can grant ordinary device write access to a userspace shadow stack.
> On x86, pte_write() is true for a shadow-stack PTE, so a populated page
> can be returned with HMM_PFN_WRITE without taking a CPU write fault.
> 
> Nouveau translates that flag into a writable GPU mapping.
> 
> Reject shadow-stack VMAs in hmm_vma_walk_test(). Use the existing
> unsupported-range handling: a requested fault returns -EFAULT, while a
> snapshot records HMM_PFN_ERROR.
> 
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20261111-mason-migrate-et-al-fixes-v1-10-3d2454362e8d@kernel.org/
> Fixes: 54007f818206 ("mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: "Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)" <ljs@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Gregory Price (Meta) <gourry@gourry.net>
> ---
>  mm/hmm.c | 3 +++
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/mm/hmm.c b/mm/hmm.c
> index 2f1e98c6b644..fa61ca59d927 100644
> --- a/mm/hmm.c
> +++ b/mm/hmm.c
> @@ -596,6 +596,7 @@ static int hmm_vma_walk_test(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
>  	struct vm_area_struct *vma = walk->vma;
>  
>  	if (!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP)) &&
> +	    !vma_test_single_mask(vma, VMA_SHADOW_STACK) &&
>  	    vma->vm_flags & VM_READ)
>  		return 0;
>  
> @@ -607,6 +608,8 @@ static int hmm_vma_walk_test(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
>  	 * allow write access either. HMM does not support architectures that
>  	 * allow write without read.
>  	 *
> +	 * Devices must not gain ordinary write access to shadow stacks.
> +	 *
>  	 * If a fault is requested for an unsupported range then it is a hard
>  	 * failure.
>  	 */

Cool, so I can drop

	e27dc0754e3f4 mm/hmm: refuse shadow stack vmas in hmm_range_fault()

:)

Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org>


I used the comment:

+        * Shadow stack VMAs must not be written, and there is no particular
+        * reason to allow read access to shadow stacks from devices, so just
+        * disallow it entirely.
+        *

-- 
Cheers,

David

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
  2026-11-13 19:55 [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings Gregory Price (Meta)
  2026-11-13 19:57 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
@ 2026-11-13 20:03 ` Jason Gunthorpe
  2026-11-13 20:41   ` Gregory Price (Meta)
  2026-11-13 20:03 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
  2 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Jason Gunthorpe @ 2026-11-13 20:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Gregory Price (Meta)
  Cc: linux-mm, linux-kernel, kernel-team, leon, akpm, david, kas,
	dave.hansen, bp, rppt, stable, Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)

On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 02:55:36PM -0500, Gregory Price (Meta) wrote:
> HMM can grant ordinary device write access to a userspace shadow stack.
> On x86, pte_write() is true for a shadow-stack PTE, so a populated page
> can be returned with HMM_PFN_WRITE without taking a CPU write fault.

I'm not sure I understand this? The pte is writable but you don't want
only DMA to write to it?

Is there something special on x86 that makes the shadow stack pte
non-writable by the CPU?

A few more words here would help

Regardless, this seems reasonable to me, there is no use case to
write to the shadow stack..

Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>

Jason

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
  2026-11-13 19:57 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
@ 2026-11-13 20:15   ` Gregory Price (Meta)
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Gregory Price (Meta) @ 2026-11-13 20:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
  Cc: Gregory Price (Meta),
	linux-mm, linux-kernel, kernel-team, jgg, leon, akpm, david, kas,
	dave.hansen, bp, rppt, stable

On 2026-11-13 19:57 +0000, Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 02:55:36PM -0500, Gregory Price (Meta) wrote:
> > HMM can grant ordinary device write access to a userspace shadow stack.
> > On x86, pte_write() is true for a shadow-stack PTE, so a populated page
> > can be returned with HMM_PFN_WRITE without taking a CPU write fault.
> >
> > Nouveau translates that flag into a writable GPU mapping.
> >
> > Reject shadow-stack VMAs in hmm_vma_walk_test(). Use the existing
> > unsupported-range handling: a requested fault returns -EFAULT, while a
> > snapshot records HMM_PFN_ERROR.
> >
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20261111-mason-migrate-et-al-fixes-v1-10-3d2454362e8d@kernel.org/
> > Fixes: 54007f818206 ("mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory")
> > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > Cc: "Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)" <ljs@kernel.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Gregory Price (Meta) <gourry@gourry.net>
> 
> Thanks for doing the HMM side of this, LGTM and:
> 

Fell out of my testing harness when reviewing yours :]

Stuff like this is becoming much lower effort than yesteryear.

> Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs@kernel.org>

thanks!

-- 
~Gregory


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
  2026-11-13 20:03 ` Jason Gunthorpe
@ 2026-11-13 20:41   ` Gregory Price (Meta)
  2026-11-14  0:20     ` Jason Gunthorpe
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Gregory Price (Meta) @ 2026-11-13 20:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Jason Gunthorpe
  Cc: Gregory Price (Meta),
	linux-mm, linux-kernel, kernel-team, leon, akpm, david, kas,
	dave.hansen, bp, rppt, stable, Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)

On 2026-11-13 16:03 -0400, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 02:55:36PM -0500, Gregory Price (Meta) wrote:
> > HMM can grant ordinary device write access to a userspace shadow stack.
> > On x86, pte_write() is true for a shadow-stack PTE, so a populated page
> > can be returned with HMM_PFN_WRITE without taking a CPU write fault.
> 
> I'm not sure I understand this? The pte is writable but you don't want
> only DMA to write to it?
>
> Is there something special on x86 that makes the shadow stack pte
> non-writable by the CPU?
>

Some of the context is here:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261111-mason-migrate-et-al-fixes-v1-10-3d2454362e8d@kernel.org/

We had a similar issue with migration, but this should handle the DMA
case as well.

It's "technically writable" but the kernel is supposed to prevent that.

I will say my understanding of the larger HMM picture is limited, so
there might be a better way than special-casing it like this.

-- 
~Gregory


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
  2026-11-13 20:03 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
@ 2026-11-13 20:42   ` Gregory Price (Meta)
  2026-11-13 21:19     ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Gregory Price (Meta) @ 2026-11-13 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: David Hildenbrand (Arm)
  Cc: Gregory Price (Meta),
	linux-mm, linux-kernel, kernel-team, jgg, leon, akpm, kas,
	dave.hansen, bp, rppt, stable, Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)

On 2026-11-13 21:03 +0100, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote:
> On 11/13/26 20:55, Gregory Price (Meta) wrote:
> Cool, so I can drop
> 
> 	e27dc0754e3f4 mm/hmm: refuse shadow stack vmas in hmm_range_fault()
> 
> :)
> 

Haven't seen that one :], i suppose *yoink*

> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org>
> 
> 
> I used the comment:
> 
> +        * Shadow stack VMAs must not be written, and there is no particular
> +        * reason to allow read access to shadow stacks from devices, so just
> +        * disallow it entirely.
> +        *
> 

Seems reasonable, maybe addresses Jason's request for additional
context.

-- 
~Gregory


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
  2026-11-13 20:42   ` Gregory Price (Meta)
@ 2026-11-13 21:19     ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: David Hildenbrand (Arm) @ 2026-11-13 21:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Gregory Price (Meta)
  Cc: linux-mm, linux-kernel, kernel-team, jgg, leon, akpm, kas,
	dave.hansen, bp, rppt, stable, Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)

On 11/13/26 21:42, Gregory Price (Meta) wrote:
> On 2026-11-13 21:03 +0100, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote:
>> On 11/13/26 20:55, Gregory Price (Meta) wrote:
>> Cool, so I can drop
>>
>> 	e27dc0754e3f4 mm/hmm: refuse shadow stack vmas in hmm_range_fault()
>>
>> :)
>>
> 
> Haven't seen that one :], i suppose *yoink*

Not posted yet, I'm preparing a bigger set again, but I'm happy about anything I
have to drop! :)

-- 
Cheers,

David

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
  2026-11-13 20:41   ` Gregory Price (Meta)
@ 2026-11-14  0:20     ` Jason Gunthorpe
  2026-11-14  2:10       ` Andrew Morton
  2026-11-14  7:25       ` Gregory Price (Meta)
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Jason Gunthorpe @ 2026-11-14  0:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Gregory Price (Meta)
  Cc: linux-mm, linux-kernel, kernel-team, leon, akpm, david, kas,
	dave.hansen, bp, rppt, stable, Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)

On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 03:41:33PM -0500, Gregory Price (Meta) wrote:
> On 2026-11-13 16:03 -0400, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> > On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 02:55:36PM -0500, Gregory Price (Meta) wrote:
> > > HMM can grant ordinary device write access to a userspace shadow stack.
> > > On x86, pte_write() is true for a shadow-stack PTE, so a populated page
> > > can be returned with HMM_PFN_WRITE without taking a CPU write fault.
> > 
> > I'm not sure I understand this? The pte is writable but you don't want
> > only DMA to write to it?
> >
> > Is there something special on x86 that makes the shadow stack pte
> > non-writable by the CPU?
> >
> 
> Some of the context is here:
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261111-mason-migrate-et-al-fixes-v1-10-3d2454362e8d@kernel.org/
> 
> We had a similar issue with migration, but this should handle the DMA
> case as well.
> 
> It's "technically writable" but the kernel is supposed to prevent that.

Bah, it's not writable at all. The CPU PTE has write disabled and
someone thought it was a good idea to make pte_write() return true
because the CPU allows writes through a special instruction on this
special PTE? So now all the places like this think its writable, when
it really isn't.

You could also fix this by having something like pte_real_write() or
whatever that doesn't lie about the write bit in the PTE :|

The patch is still fine, in that it matches what everything else does,
but I'd include these details someplace..

Jason

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
  2026-11-14  0:20     ` Jason Gunthorpe
@ 2026-11-14  2:10       ` Andrew Morton
  2026-11-15  0:00         ` Jason Gunthorpe
  2026-11-14  7:25       ` Gregory Price (Meta)
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Andrew Morton @ 2026-11-14  2:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Jason Gunthorpe
  Cc: Gregory Price (Meta),
	linux-mm, linux-kernel, kernel-team, leon, david, kas,
	dave.hansen, bp, rppt, stable, Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)

On Fri, 13 Nov 2026 20:20:27 -0400 Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> wrote:

> On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 03:41:33PM -0500, Gregory Price (Meta) wrote:
> > On 2026-11-13 16:03 -0400, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> > > On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 02:55:36PM -0500, Gregory Price (Meta) wrote:
> > > > HMM can grant ordinary device write access to a userspace shadow stack.
> > > > On x86, pte_write() is true for a shadow-stack PTE, so a populated page
> > > > can be returned with HMM_PFN_WRITE without taking a CPU write fault.
> > > 
> > > I'm not sure I understand this? The pte is writable but you don't want
> > > only DMA to write to it?
> > >
> > > Is there something special on x86 that makes the shadow stack pte
> > > non-writable by the CPU?
> > >
> > 
> > Some of the context is here:
> > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261111-mason-migrate-et-al-fixes-v1-10-3d2454362e8d@kernel.org/
> > 
> > We had a similar issue with migration, but this should handle the DMA
> > case as well.
> > 
> > It's "technically writable" but the kernel is supposed to prevent that.
> 
> Bah, it's not writable at all. The CPU PTE has write disabled and
> someone thought it was a good idea to make pte_write() return true
> because the CPU allows writes through a special instruction on this
> special PTE? So now all the places like this think its writable, when
> it really isn't.
> 
> You could also fix this by having something like pte_real_write() or
> whatever that doesn't lie about the write bit in the PTE :|
> 
> The patch is still fine, in that it matches what everything else does,
> but I'd include these details someplace..

How does this look for an altered changelog?

: On x86, a shadow-stack PTE has its ordinary write bit clear.  The CPU
: rejects ordinary stores to it, but pte_write() reports it writable because
: shadow-stack instructions can write it.  HMM consequently sets
: HMM_PFN_WRITE, which Nouveau turns into ordinary GPU write permission.  A
: process with GPU access can then overwrite its own shadow stack,
: potentially corrupting return addresses or bypassing that protection.
: 
: Reject shadow-stack VMAs in hmm_vma_walk_test(), including read access.  A
: requested fault returns -EFAULT; a snapshot records HMM_PFN_ERROR.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
  2026-11-14  0:20     ` Jason Gunthorpe
  2026-11-14  2:10       ` Andrew Morton
@ 2026-11-14  7:25       ` Gregory Price (Meta)
  2026-11-14 11:11         ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Gregory Price (Meta) @ 2026-11-14  7:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Jason Gunthorpe
  Cc: Gregory Price (Meta),
	linux-mm, linux-kernel, kernel-team, leon, akpm, david, kas,
	dave.hansen, bp, rppt, stable, Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)

On 2026-11-13 20:20 -0400, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 03:41:33PM -0500, Gregory Price (Meta) wrote:
> > On 2026-11-13 16:03 -0400, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> > > On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 02:55:36PM -0500, Gregory Price (Meta) wrote:
> > > > HMM can grant ordinary device write access to a userspace shadow stack.
> > > > On x86, pte_write() is true for a shadow-stack PTE, so a populated page
> > > > can be returned with HMM_PFN_WRITE without taking a CPU write fault.
> > > 
> > > I'm not sure I understand this? The pte is writable but you don't want
> > > only DMA to write to it?
> > >
> > > Is there something special on x86 that makes the shadow stack pte
> > > non-writable by the CPU?
> > >
> > 
> > Some of the context is here:
> > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261111-mason-migrate-et-al-fixes-v1-10-3d2454362e8d@kernel.org/
> > 
> > We had a similar issue with migration, but this should handle the DMA
> > case as well.
> > 
> > It's "technically writable" but the kernel is supposed to prevent that.
> 
> Bah, it's not writable at all. The CPU PTE has write disabled and
> someone thought it was a good idea to make pte_write() return true
> because the CPU allows writes through a special instruction on this
> special PTE? So now all the places like this think its writable, when
> it really isn't.
>

I completely missed this, that will teach me to trust pte_write() I
guess... what a bizarre design choice.  I'm sure there's "reasons".

> You could also fix this by having something like pte_real_write() or
> whatever that doesn't lie about the write bit in the PTE :|
> 

or rename pte_write() to pte_fake_write() instead and restore
pte_write() to its former truthful glory

:| indeed

> The patch is still fine, in that it matches what everything else does,
> but I'd include these details someplace..
> 

Thank you for taking a closer look, I think Andrew's changelog
adjustment is an improvement if you're ok with it.

-- 
~Gregory


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
  2026-11-14  7:25       ` Gregory Price (Meta)
@ 2026-11-14 11:11         ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
  2026-11-15 23:48           ` Alistair Popple
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: David Hildenbrand (Arm) @ 2026-11-14 11:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Gregory Price (Meta), Jason Gunthorpe
  Cc: linux-mm, linux-kernel, kernel-team, leon, akpm, kas,
	dave.hansen, bp, rppt, stable, Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)

On 11/14/26 08:25, Gregory Price (Meta) wrote:
> On 2026-11-13 20:20 -0400, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
>> On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 03:41:33PM -0500, Gregory Price (Meta) wrote:
>>>
>>> Some of the context is here:
>>> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261111-mason-migrate-et-al-fixes-v1-10-3d2454362e8d@kernel.org/
>>>
>>> We had a similar issue with migration, but this should handle the DMA
>>> case as well.
>>>
>>> It's "technically writable" but the kernel is supposed to prevent that.
>>
>> Bah, it's not writable at all. The CPU PTE has write disabled and
>> someone thought it was a good idea to make pte_write() return true
>> because the CPU allows writes through a special instruction on this
>> special PTE? So now all the places like this think its writable, when
>> it really isn't.
>>
> 
> I completely missed this, that will teach me to trust pte_write() I
> guess... what a bizarre design choice.  I'm sure there's "reasons".
> 
>> You could also fix this by having something like pte_real_write() or
>> whatever that doesn't lie about the write bit in the PTE :|
>>
> 
> or rename pte_write() to pte_fake_write() instead and restore
> pte_write() to its former truthful glory

It's writable by the hardware, that's what matters to core-mm, for example, when
it comes to things like fork(), mproetect() etc.

*nobody* besides selected core-mm code should ever write to random PTEs. They
shouldn't ever even care about pte_write().

We have GUP for that, which takes care of that oddity properly when deciding
whether we can *actually* write to a mapped page.

Well, and we have HMM that reimplements part of GUP in ugly ways (sorry) that we
missed.

-- 
Cheers,

David

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
  2026-11-14  2:10       ` Andrew Morton
@ 2026-11-15  0:00         ` Jason Gunthorpe
  2026-11-15  1:01           ` Andrew Morton
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Jason Gunthorpe @ 2026-11-15  0:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andrew Morton
  Cc: Gregory Price (Meta),
	linux-mm, linux-kernel, kernel-team, leon, david, kas,
	dave.hansen, bp, rppt, stable, Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)

On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 06:10:25PM -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:

> How does this look for an altered changelog?
> 
> : On x86, a shadow-stack PTE has its ordinary write bit clear.  The CPU
> : rejects ordinary stores to it, but pte_write() reports it writable because
> : shadow-stack instructions can write it.  HMM consequently sets
> : HMM_PFN_WRITE, which Nouveau turns into ordinary GPU write permission.  A
> : process with GPU access can then overwrite its own shadow stack,
> : potentially corrupting return addresses or bypassing that protection.
> : 
> : Reject shadow-stack VMAs in hmm_vma_walk_test(), including read access.  A
> : requested fault returns -EFAULT; a snapshot records HMM_PFN_ERROR.

Yes, but it is not just nouveau, RDMA user can do this too and
that is far more common..

Thanks,
Jason

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
  2026-11-15  0:00         ` Jason Gunthorpe
@ 2026-11-15  1:01           ` Andrew Morton
  2026-11-15 23:27             ` Jason Gunthorpe
                               ` (2 more replies)
  0 siblings, 3 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Andrew Morton @ 2026-11-15  1:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Jason Gunthorpe
  Cc: Gregory Price (Meta),
	linux-mm, linux-kernel, kernel-team, leon, david, kas,
	dave.hansen, bp, rppt, stable, Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)

On Sat, 14 Nov 2026 20:00:05 -0400 Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> wrote:

> On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 06:10:25PM -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
> 
> > How does this look for an altered changelog?
> > 
> > : On x86, a shadow-stack PTE has its ordinary write bit clear.  The CPU
> > : rejects ordinary stores to it, but pte_write() reports it writable because
> > : shadow-stack instructions can write it.  HMM consequently sets
> > : HMM_PFN_WRITE, which Nouveau turns into ordinary GPU write permission.  A
> > : process with GPU access can then overwrite its own shadow stack,
> > : potentially corrupting return addresses or bypassing that protection.
> > : 
> > : Reject shadow-stack VMAs in hmm_vma_walk_test(), including read access.  A
> > : requested fault returns -EFAULT; a snapshot records HMM_PFN_ERROR.
> 
> Yes, but it is not just nouveau, RDMA user can do this too and
> that is far more common..

Thanks.  This?

On x86, a shadow-stack PTE has its ordinary write bit clear.  The CPU
rejects ordinary stores, but pte_write() reports it writable because
shadow-stack instructions can write it.  HMM consequently sets
HMM_PFN_WRITE.  Nouveau uses that flag for GPU write permission, and
RDMA on-demand paging can use it to grant device write permission to a
registered memory region.  A device, or an RDMA peer with write access
to that region, can then overwrite the process's shadow stack,
potentially corrupting return addresses or bypassing that protection.

Reject shadow-stack VMAs in hmm_vma_walk_test(), including read access.
A requested fault returns -EFAULT; a snapshot records HMM_PFN_ERROR.


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
  2026-11-15  1:01           ` Andrew Morton
@ 2026-11-15 23:27             ` Jason Gunthorpe
  2026-11-19 20:05             ` Dave Hansen
  2026-11-19 20:33             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Jason Gunthorpe @ 2026-11-15 23:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andrew Morton
  Cc: Gregory Price (Meta),
	linux-mm, linux-kernel, kernel-team, leon, david, kas,
	dave.hansen, bp, rppt, stable, Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)

On Sat, Nov 14, 2026 at 05:01:27PM -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Sat, 14 Nov 2026 20:00:05 -0400 Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> wrote:
> 
> > On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 06:10:25PM -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
> > 
> > > How does this look for an altered changelog?
> > > 
> > > : On x86, a shadow-stack PTE has its ordinary write bit clear.  The CPU
> > > : rejects ordinary stores to it, but pte_write() reports it writable because
> > > : shadow-stack instructions can write it.  HMM consequently sets
> > > : HMM_PFN_WRITE, which Nouveau turns into ordinary GPU write permission.  A
> > > : process with GPU access can then overwrite its own shadow stack,
> > > : potentially corrupting return addresses or bypassing that protection.
> > > : 
> > > : Reject shadow-stack VMAs in hmm_vma_walk_test(), including read access.  A
> > > : requested fault returns -EFAULT; a snapshot records HMM_PFN_ERROR.
> > 
> > Yes, but it is not just nouveau, RDMA user can do this too and
> > that is far more common..
> 
> Thanks.  This?
> 
> On x86, a shadow-stack PTE has its ordinary write bit clear.  The CPU
> rejects ordinary stores, but pte_write() reports it writable because
> shadow-stack instructions can write it.  HMM consequently sets
> HMM_PFN_WRITE.  Nouveau uses that flag for GPU write permission, and
> RDMA on-demand paging can use it to grant device write permission to a
> registered memory region.  A device, or an RDMA peer with write access
> to that region, can then overwrite the process's shadow stack,
> potentially corrupting return addresses or bypassing that protection.
> 
> Reject shadow-stack VMAs in hmm_vma_walk_test(), including read access.
> A requested fault returns -EFAULT; a snapshot records HMM_PFN_ERROR.

Sure, thanks

Jason

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
  2026-11-14 11:11         ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
@ 2026-11-15 23:48           ` Alistair Popple
  2026-11-16 16:09             ` Gregory Price (Meta)
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Alistair Popple @ 2026-11-15 23:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: David Hildenbrand (Arm)
  Cc: Gregory Price (Meta),
	Jason Gunthorpe, linux-mm, linux-kernel, kernel-team, leon, akpm,
	kas, dave.hansen, bp, rppt, stable, Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)

On 2026-11-14 at 22:11 +1100, "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org> wrote...
> On 11/14/26 08:25, Gregory Price (Meta) wrote:
> > On 2026-11-13 20:20 -0400, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> >> On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 03:41:33PM -0500, Gregory Price (Meta) wrote:
> >>>
> >>> Some of the context is here:
> >>> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261111-mason-migrate-et-al-fixes-v1-10-3d2454362e8d@kernel.org/
> >>>
> >>> We had a similar issue with migration, but this should handle the DMA
> >>> case as well.

Yeah, I asked the HMM question there -
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/avT2FNTZoEuijEZP@nvdebian.thelocal/

> >>>
> >>> It's "technically writable" but the kernel is supposed to prevent that.
> >>
> >> Bah, it's not writable at all. The CPU PTE has write disabled and
> >> someone thought it was a good idea to make pte_write() return true
> >> because the CPU allows writes through a special instruction on this
> >> special PTE? So now all the places like this think its writable, when
> >> it really isn't.
> >>
> > 
> > I completely missed this, that will teach me to trust pte_write() I
> > guess... what a bizarre design choice.  I'm sure there's "reasons".

Yeah, that surprised me as well when I looked into how the shadow stack worked.

> >> You could also fix this by having something like pte_real_write() or
> >> whatever that doesn't lie about the write bit in the PTE :|
> >>
> > 
> > or rename pte_write() to pte_fake_write() instead and restore
> > pte_write() to its former truthful glory
> 
> It's writable by the hardware, that's what matters to core-mm, for example, when
> it comes to things like fork(), mproetect() etc.

Except they're not universally writable by HW, after all _PAGE_RW = 0. So
pte_write() is documented to return if it is logically writable, which of course
is what hmm_range_fault() also needs for certain values of "logic" :-)

So it's easy to see how this is confusing and got missed. Anyway this fix looks
good:

Reviewed-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>

> *nobody* besides selected core-mm code should ever write to random PTEs. They
> shouldn't ever even care about pte_write().
> 
> We have GUP for that, which takes care of that oddity properly when deciding
> whether we can *actually* write to a mapped page.
> 
> Well, and we have HMM that reimplements part of GUP in ugly ways (sorry) that we
> missed.
> 
> -- 
> Cheers,
> 
> David
> 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
  2026-11-15 23:48           ` Alistair Popple
@ 2026-11-16 16:09             ` Gregory Price (Meta)
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Gregory Price (Meta) @ 2026-11-16 16:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Alistair Popple
  Cc: David Hildenbrand (Arm), Gregory Price (Meta),
	Jason Gunthorpe, linux-mm, linux-kernel, kernel-team, leon, akpm,
	kas, dave.hansen, bp, rppt, stable, Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)

On 2026-11-16 10:48 +1100, Alistair Popple wrote:
> On 2026-11-14 at 22:11 +1100, "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org> wrote...
> > It's writable by the hardware, that's what matters to core-mm, for example, when
> > it comes to things like fork(), mproetect() etc.
> 
> Except they're not universally writable by HW, after all _PAGE_RW = 0. So
> pte_write() is documented to return if it is logically writable, which of course
> is what hmm_range_fault() also needs for certain values of "logic" :-)
> 
> So it's easy to see how this is confusing and got missed. Anyway this fix looks
> good:
> 
> Reviewed-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
> 

Thank's Alistair!

-- 
~Gregory


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
  2026-11-15  1:01           ` Andrew Morton
  2026-11-15 23:27             ` Jason Gunthorpe
@ 2026-11-19 20:05             ` Dave Hansen
  2026-11-19 20:16               ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
  2026-11-19 20:40               ` Edgecombe, Rick P
  2026-11-19 20:33             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
  2 siblings, 2 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2026-11-19 20:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andrew Morton, Jason Gunthorpe
  Cc: Gregory Price (Meta),
	linux-mm, linux-kernel, kernel-team, leon, david, kas,
	dave.hansen, bp, rppt, stable, Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)

On 11/14/26 17:01, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On x86, a shadow-stack PTE has its ordinary write bit clear.  The CPU
> rejects ordinary stores, but pte_write() reports it writable because
> shadow-stack instructions can write it.  HMM consequently sets
> HMM_PFN_WRITE.  Nouveau uses that flag for GPU write permission, and
> RDMA on-demand paging can use it to grant device write permission to a
> registered memory region.  A device, or an RDMA peer with write access
> to that region, can then overwrite the process's shadow stack,
> potentially corrupting return addresses or bypassing that protection.
> 
> Reject shadow-stack VMAs in hmm_vma_walk_test(), including read access.
> A requested fault returns -EFAULT; a snapshot records HMM_PFN_ERROR.

This is a fun one.

I almost wonder if we want to go one step further and disallow GUPs with
FOLL_WRITE on these PTEs. There should be precious few reasons for
devices to be writing to shadow stack pages.

Isn't this a bigger issue than HMM? Should the fix be in HMM?

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
  2026-11-19 20:05             ` Dave Hansen
@ 2026-11-19 20:16               ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
  2026-11-19 20:40               ` Edgecombe, Rick P
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: David Hildenbrand (Arm) @ 2026-11-19 20:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen, Andrew Morton, Jason Gunthorpe
  Cc: Gregory Price (Meta),
	linux-mm, linux-kernel, kernel-team, leon, kas, dave.hansen, bp,
	rppt, stable, Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)

On 11/19/26 21:05, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 11/14/26 17:01, Andrew Morton wrote:
>> On x86, a shadow-stack PTE has its ordinary write bit clear.  The CPU
>> rejects ordinary stores, but pte_write() reports it writable because
>> shadow-stack instructions can write it.  HMM consequently sets
>> HMM_PFN_WRITE.  Nouveau uses that flag for GPU write permission, and
>> RDMA on-demand paging can use it to grant device write permission to a
>> registered memory region.  A device, or an RDMA peer with write access
>> to that region, can then overwrite the process's shadow stack,
>> potentially corrupting return addresses or bypassing that protection.
>>
>> Reject shadow-stack VMAs in hmm_vma_walk_test(), including read access.
>> A requested fault returns -EFAULT; a snapshot records HMM_PFN_ERROR.
> 
> This is a fun one.
> 
> I almost wonder if we want to go one step further and disallow GUPs with
> FOLL_WRITE on these PTEs. There should be precious few reasons for
> devices to be writing to shadow stack pages.
> 
> Isn't this a bigger issue than HMM? Should the fix be in HMM?

I think we discussed this excessively after I raised it and it's even partially
documented in the relevant commit messages.

-- 
Cheers,

David

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
  2026-11-15  1:01           ` Andrew Morton
  2026-11-15 23:27             ` Jason Gunthorpe
  2026-11-19 20:05             ` Dave Hansen
@ 2026-11-19 20:33             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Edgecombe, Rick P @ 2026-11-19 20:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: jgg, akpm
  Cc: ljs, dave.hansen, david, linux-mm, kernel-team, linux-kernel,
	rppt, bp, kas, leon, stable, gourry

On Sat, 2026-11-14 at 17:01 -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
> Thanks.  This?
> 
> On x86, a shadow-stack PTE has its ordinary write bit clear.  The CPU
> rejects ordinary stores, but pte_write() reports it writable because
> shadow-stack instructions can write it.  HMM consequently sets
> HMM_PFN_WRITE.  Nouveau uses that flag for GPU write permission, and
> RDMA on-demand paging can use it to grant device write permission to a
> registered memory region.  A device, or an RDMA peer with write access
> to that region, can then overwrite the process's shadow stack,
> potentially corrupting return addresses or bypassing that protection.
> 
> Reject shadow-stack VMAs in hmm_vma_walk_test(), including read access.
> A requested fault returns -EFAULT; a snapshot records HMM_PFN_ERROR.

BTW, this is not just an x86 thing. Arm and riscv have the same pte_write()
shadow stack behavior for the same reasons. Despite not having the
Write=0,Dirty=1 thing, which *is* weird. But they still try to prevent the
kernel from writing it via logic in gup, etc.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
  2026-11-19 20:05             ` Dave Hansen
  2026-11-19 20:16               ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
@ 2026-11-19 20:40               ` Edgecombe, Rick P
  2026-11-19 22:19                 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Edgecombe, Rick P @ 2026-11-19 20:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: jgg, Hansen, Dave, akpm
  Cc: ljs, dave.hansen, david, linux-mm, kernel-team, linux-kernel,
	rppt, bp, kas, leon, stable, gourry

On Thu, 2026-11-19 at 12:05 -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 11/14/26 17:01, Andrew Morton wrote:
> > On x86, a shadow-stack PTE has its ordinary write bit clear.  The CPU
> > rejects ordinary stores, but pte_write() reports it writable because
> > shadow-stack instructions can write it.  HMM consequently sets
> > HMM_PFN_WRITE.  Nouveau uses that flag for GPU write permission, and
> > RDMA on-demand paging can use it to grant device write permission to a
> > registered memory region.  A device, or an RDMA peer with write access
> > to that region, can then overwrite the process's shadow stack,
> > potentially corrupting return addresses or bypassing that protection.
> > 
> > Reject shadow-stack VMAs in hmm_vma_walk_test(), including read access.
> > A requested fault returns -EFAULT; a snapshot records HMM_PFN_ERROR.
> 
> This is a fun one.
> 
> I almost wonder if we want to go one step further and disallow GUPs with
> FOLL_WRITE on these PTEs. There should be precious few reasons for
> devices to be writing to shadow stack pages.
> 
> Isn't this a bigger issue than HMM? Should the fix be in HMM?

We do reject GUPs to shadow stack PTEs with FOLL_WRITE, unless FOLL_FORCE is
passed. The tricky thing as mentioned my others in this thread is that shadow
stack memory *is* writable by userspace. But also the kernel should not treat it
as such

A false negative for pte_write() is dangerous when the kernel needs to decide
when to revoke access. (i.e. fork) I think a mistake there is somewhat worse
then missing an exotic way to cajole the kernel into writing to a user's shadow
stack like this. So I think pte_write() being true for shadow stacks is the
correct implementation.

But, maybe the problem is that pte_write() is doing the job of two separate
concepts. What if there was a pte_userspace_could_write() and a
pte_kernel_should_not_write()? Names would need some work...

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
  2026-11-19 20:40               ` Edgecombe, Rick P
@ 2026-11-19 22:19                 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: David Hildenbrand (Arm) @ 2026-11-19 22:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Edgecombe, Rick P, jgg, Hansen, Dave, akpm
  Cc: ljs, dave.hansen, linux-mm, kernel-team, linux-kernel, rppt, bp,
	kas, leon, stable, gourry

On 11/19/26 21:40, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:
> On Thu, 2026-11-19 at 12:05 -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
>> On 11/14/26 17:01, Andrew Morton wrote:
>>> On x86, a shadow-stack PTE has its ordinary write bit clear.  The CPU
>>> rejects ordinary stores, but pte_write() reports it writable because
>>> shadow-stack instructions can write it.  HMM consequently sets
>>> HMM_PFN_WRITE.  Nouveau uses that flag for GPU write permission, and
>>> RDMA on-demand paging can use it to grant device write permission to a
>>> registered memory region.  A device, or an RDMA peer with write access
>>> to that region, can then overwrite the process's shadow stack,
>>> potentially corrupting return addresses or bypassing that protection.
>>>
>>> Reject shadow-stack VMAs in hmm_vma_walk_test(), including read access.
>>> A requested fault returns -EFAULT; a snapshot records HMM_PFN_ERROR.
>>
>> This is a fun one.
>>
>> I almost wonder if we want to go one step further and disallow GUPs with
>> FOLL_WRITE on these PTEs. There should be precious few reasons for
>> devices to be writing to shadow stack pages.
>>
>> Isn't this a bigger issue than HMM? Should the fix be in HMM?
> 
> We do reject GUPs to shadow stack PTEs with FOLL_WRITE, unless FOLL_FORCE is
> passed. The tricky thing as mentioned my others in this thread is that shadow
> stack memory *is* writable by userspace. But also the kernel should not treat it
> as such
> 
> A false negative for pte_write() is dangerous when the kernel needs to decide
> when to revoke access. (i.e. fork) I think a mistake there is somewhat worse
> then missing an exotic way to cajole the kernel into writing to a user's shadow
> stack like this. So I think pte_write() being true for shadow stacks is the
> correct implementation.
> 
> But, maybe the problem is that pte_write() is doing the job of two separate
> concepts. What if there was a pte_userspace_could_write() and a
> pte_kernel_should_not_write()? Names would need some work...

Gah, nak,

pte_write() just says "something might be able to write to it".

If that's actually true depends on other factors. Like the access+dirty on HW
that manages that in software.

I repeat: *no code* in Linux besides core-mm should ever interpret "pte_write()"
as "cool, I can write to it". The exception is GUP and unfortunately HMM.

-- 
Cheers,

David

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2026-11-19 22:19 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-11-13 19:55 [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings Gregory Price (Meta)
2026-11-13 19:57 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-11-13 20:15   ` Gregory Price (Meta)
2026-11-13 20:03 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-13 20:41   ` Gregory Price (Meta)
2026-11-14  0:20     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-14  2:10       ` Andrew Morton
2026-11-15  0:00         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-15  1:01           ` Andrew Morton
2026-11-15 23:27             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-19 20:05             ` Dave Hansen
2026-11-19 20:16               ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-11-19 20:40               ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-11-19 22:19                 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-11-19 20:33             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-11-14  7:25       ` Gregory Price (Meta)
2026-11-14 11:11         ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-11-15 23:48           ` Alistair Popple
2026-11-16 16:09             ` Gregory Price (Meta)
2026-11-13 20:03 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-11-13 20:42   ` Gregory Price (Meta)
2026-11-13 21:19     ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)

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