From: mlevitsk@redhat.com
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: d.riley@proxmox.com, jon@nutanix.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/28] KVM: x86/mmu: separate more EPT/non-EPT permission_fault()
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2026 10:22:45 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <37a72b78565edf3e602d914820b5ee30e0ffd189.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260505195226.563317-9-pbonzini@redhat.com>
On Tue, 2026-05-05 at 21:52 +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> Move more of EPT handling entirely in the existing "if (!ept)"
> conditional. Use a new "rf" variable instead of uf for read permissions
> for clarity.
>
> Merge smepf and ff into a single variable because EPT's "SMEP" (actually
> MBEC) is defined differently and does not need smepf.
>
> Tested-by: David Riley <d.riley@proxmox.com>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
> 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> index d94a488db79d..fc34536c536b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> @@ -5584,24 +5584,28 @@ static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool ept)
> * that causes a fault with the given PFEC.
> */
>
> + /* Faults from reads to non-readable pages */
> + u8 rf = 0;
> /* Faults from writes to non-writable pages */
> u8 wf = (pfec & PFERR_WRITE_MASK) ? (u8)~w : 0;
> /* Faults from user mode accesses to supervisor pages */
> - u8 uf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? (u8)~u : 0;
> - /* Faults from fetches of non-executable pages*/
> - u8 ff = (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? (u8)~x : 0;
> - /* Faults from kernel mode fetches of user pages */
> - u8 smepf = 0;
> + u8 uf = 0;
I am thinking: maybe call this usf?
Just an idea, I am not sure that it will be better that current name.
> + /* Faults from fetches of non-executable pages */
> + u8 ff = 0;
> /* Faults from kernel mode accesses of user pages */
> u8 smapf = 0;
>
> - if (!ept) {
> + if (ept) {
> + rf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? (u8)~u : 0;
> + ff = (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? (u8)~x : 0;
> + } else {
> /* Faults from kernel mode accesses to user pages */
> u8 kf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? 0 : u;
And rename this to suf?
>
> - /* Not really needed: !nx will cause pte.nx to fault */
> - if (!efer_nx)
> - ff = 0;
> + uf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? (u8)~u : 0;
> +
> + if (efer_nx)
> + ff = (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? (u8)~x : 0;
>
> /* Allow supervisor writes if !cr0.wp */
> if (!cr0_wp)
> @@ -5609,7 +5613,7 @@ static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool ept)
>
> /* Disallow supervisor fetches of user code if cr4.smep */
> if (cr4_smep)
> - smepf = (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? kf : 0;
> + ff |= (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? kf : 0;
>
> /*
> * SMAP:kernel-mode data accesses from user-mode
> @@ -5630,7 +5634,7 @@ static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool ept)
> smapf = (pfec & (PFERR_RSVD_MASK|PFERR_FETCH_MASK)) ? 0 : kf;
> }
>
> - mmu->permissions[index] = ff | uf | wf | smepf | smapf;
> + mmu->permissions[index] = ff | uf | wf | rf | smapf;
> }
> }
>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-02 14:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-05 19:51 [PATCH v6 00/28] KVM: combined patchset for MBEC/GMET support Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:51 ` [PATCH 01/28] KVM: TDX/VMX: rework EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN into PROT_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:19 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 02/28] KVM: x86/mmu: remove SPTE_PERM_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:20 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 03/28] KVM: x86/mmu: free up bit 10 of PTEs in preparation for MBEC Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:20 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 04/28] KVM: x86/mmu: shuffle high bits of SPTEs " Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:20 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 05/28] KVM: x86/mmu: remove SPTE_EPT_* Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:21 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 06/28] KVM: x86/mmu: merge make_spte_{non,}executable Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:22 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 07/28] KVM: x86/mmu: rename and clarify BYTE_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:22 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 08/28] KVM: x86/mmu: separate more EPT/non-EPT permission_fault() Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-07 14:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-06-02 14:22 ` mlevitsk [this message]
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 09/28] KVM: x86/mmu: introduce ACC_READ_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:23 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 10/28] KVM: x86/mmu: pass PFERR_GUEST_PAGE/FINAL_MASK to kvm_translate_gpa Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:23 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 11/28] KVM: x86/mmu: pass pte_access for final nGPA->GPA walk Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:24 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 12/28] KVM: x86: make translate_nested_gpa vendor-specific Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:24 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 13/28] KVM: x86/mmu: split XS/XU bits for EPT Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:24 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 14/28] KVM: x86/mmu: move cr4_smep to base role Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:25 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 15/28] KVM: VMX: enable use of MBEC Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-07 14:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-06-02 14:26 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 16/28] KVM: nVMX: pass advanced EPT violation vmexit info to guest Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:26 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 17/28] KVM: nVMX: pass PFERR_USER_MASK to MMU on EPT violations Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:27 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 18/28] KVM: x86/mmu: add support for MBEC to EPT page table walks Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:28 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 19/28] KVM: nVMX: advertise MBEC to nested guests Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:28 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 20/28] KVM: nVMX: allow MBEC with EVMCS Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:28 ` mlevitsk
2026-06-02 15:29 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 21/28] KVM: x86/mmu: propagate access mask from root pages down Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:29 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 22/28] KVM: x86/mmu: introduce cpu_role bit for availability of PFEC.I/D Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:29 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 23/28] KVM: SVM: add GMET bit definitions Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:30 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 24/28] KVM: x86/mmu: hard code more bits in kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:30 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 25/28] KVM: x86/mmu: add support for GMET to NPT page table walks Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:31 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 26/28] KVM: SVM: enable GMET and set it in MMU role Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:31 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 27/28] KVM: SVM: work around errata 1218 Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:31 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 28/28] KVM: nSVM: enable GMET for guests Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:32 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-07 14:44 ` [PATCH v6 00/28] KVM: combined patchset for MBEC/GMET support Sean Christopherson
2026-05-07 17:49 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-11 10:53 ` David Riley
2026-05-11 10:55 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-11 11:07 ` David Riley
2026-05-14 2:11 ` Chao Gao
2026-05-14 19:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-05-12 14:32 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-12 16:34 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-15 14:53 ` David Riley
2026-05-15 18:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-05-19 8:02 ` David Riley
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-04-30 15:07 [PATCH v5 " Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 08/28] KVM: x86/mmu: separate more EPT/non-EPT permission_fault() Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 18:35 ` Sean Christopherson
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