From: mlevitsk@redhat.com
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: d.riley@proxmox.com, jon@nutanix.com,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/28] KVM: TDX/VMX: rework EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN into PROT_MASK
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2026 10:19:50 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e592aba166c1571cdc9019e031c4bdde42bf95b5.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260505195226.563317-2-pbonzini@redhat.com>
On Tue, 2026-05-05 at 21:51 +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> From: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
>
> EPT exit qualification bit 6 is used when mode-based execute control
> is enabled, and reflects user executable addresses. Rework name to
> reflect the intention and add to EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK, which allows
> simplifying the return evaluation in
> tdx_is_sept_violation_unexpected_pending a pinch.
>
> Rework handling in __vmx_handle_ept_violation to unconditionally clear
> EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC until MBEC is implemented, as suggested by
> Sean [1].
>
> Note: Intel SDM Table 29-7 defines bit 6 as:
> If the "mode-based execute control" VM-execution control is 0, the
> value of this bit is undefined. If that control is 1, this bit is the
> logical-AND of bit 10 in the EPT paging-structure entries used to
> translate the guest-physical address of the access causing the EPT
> violation. In this case, it indicates whether the guest-physical
> address was executable for user-mode linear addresses.
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/aCJDzU1p_SFNRIJd@google.com/
>
> Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
> Message-ID: <20251223054806.1611168-2-jon@nutanix.com>
> Tested-by: David Riley <d.riley@proxmox.com>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 5 +++--
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h | 9 +++++++--
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 2 +-
> 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> index 37080382df54..b2291a766e3f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> @@ -608,10 +608,11 @@ enum vm_entry_failure_code {
> #define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ BIT(3)
> #define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE BIT(4)
> #define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC BIT(5)
> -#define EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN BIT(6)
> +#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC BIT(6)
> #define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK (EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ | \
> EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE | \
> - EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC)
> + EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC | \
> + EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC)
> #define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID BIT(7)
> #define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED BIT(8)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
> index 412d0829d7a2..adf925500b9e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
> @@ -94,8 +94,13 @@ static inline int __vmx_handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
> /* Is it a fetch fault? */
> error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR)
> ? PFERR_FETCH_MASK : 0;
> - /* ept page table entry is present? */
> - error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK)
> + /*
> + * ept page table entry is present?
> + * note: unconditionally clear USER_EXEC until mode-based
> + * execute control is implemented
> + */
> + error_code |= (exit_qualification &
> + (EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK & ~EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC))
> ? PFERR_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
>
> if (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> index 1e47c194af53..89f9fe30435d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> @@ -1845,7 +1845,7 @@ static inline bool tdx_is_sept_violation_unexpected_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcp
> if (eeq_type != TDX_EXT_EXIT_QUAL_TYPE_PENDING_EPT_VIOLATION)
> return false;
>
> - return !(eq & EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK) && !(eq & EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN);
> + return !(eq & EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK);
> }
>
> static int tdx_handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
Looks OK to me,
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-02 14:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-05 19:51 [PATCH v6 00/28] KVM: combined patchset for MBEC/GMET support Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-05 19:51 ` [PATCH 01/28] KVM: TDX/VMX: rework EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN into PROT_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:19 ` mlevitsk [this message]
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 02/28] KVM: x86/mmu: remove SPTE_PERM_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:20 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 03/28] KVM: x86/mmu: free up bit 10 of PTEs in preparation for MBEC Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:20 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 04/28] KVM: x86/mmu: shuffle high bits of SPTEs " Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:20 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 05/28] KVM: x86/mmu: remove SPTE_EPT_* Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:21 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 06/28] KVM: x86/mmu: merge make_spte_{non,}executable Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:22 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 07/28] KVM: x86/mmu: rename and clarify BYTE_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:22 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 08/28] KVM: x86/mmu: separate more EPT/non-EPT permission_fault() Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-07 14:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-06-02 14:22 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 09/28] KVM: x86/mmu: introduce ACC_READ_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:23 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 10/28] KVM: x86/mmu: pass PFERR_GUEST_PAGE/FINAL_MASK to kvm_translate_gpa Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:23 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 11/28] KVM: x86/mmu: pass pte_access for final nGPA->GPA walk Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:24 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 12/28] KVM: x86: make translate_nested_gpa vendor-specific Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:24 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 13/28] KVM: x86/mmu: split XS/XU bits for EPT Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:24 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 14/28] KVM: x86/mmu: move cr4_smep to base role Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:25 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 15/28] KVM: VMX: enable use of MBEC Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-07 14:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-06-02 14:26 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 16/28] KVM: nVMX: pass advanced EPT violation vmexit info to guest Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:26 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 17/28] KVM: nVMX: pass PFERR_USER_MASK to MMU on EPT violations Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:27 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 18/28] KVM: x86/mmu: add support for MBEC to EPT page table walks Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:28 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 19/28] KVM: nVMX: advertise MBEC to nested guests Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:28 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 20/28] KVM: nVMX: allow MBEC with EVMCS Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:28 ` mlevitsk
2026-06-02 15:29 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 21/28] KVM: x86/mmu: propagate access mask from root pages down Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:29 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 22/28] KVM: x86/mmu: introduce cpu_role bit for availability of PFEC.I/D Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:29 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 23/28] KVM: SVM: add GMET bit definitions Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:30 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 24/28] KVM: x86/mmu: hard code more bits in kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:30 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 25/28] KVM: x86/mmu: add support for GMET to NPT page table walks Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:31 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 26/28] KVM: SVM: enable GMET and set it in MMU role Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:31 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 27/28] KVM: SVM: work around errata 1218 Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:31 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-05 19:52 ` [PATCH 28/28] KVM: nSVM: enable GMET for guests Paolo Bonzini
2026-06-02 14:32 ` mlevitsk
2026-05-07 14:44 ` [PATCH v6 00/28] KVM: combined patchset for MBEC/GMET support Sean Christopherson
2026-05-07 17:49 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-11 10:53 ` David Riley
2026-05-11 10:55 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-11 11:07 ` David Riley
2026-05-14 2:11 ` Chao Gao
2026-05-14 19:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-05-12 14:32 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-12 16:34 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-15 14:53 ` David Riley
2026-05-15 18:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-05-19 8:02 ` David Riley
2026-08-05 12:35 ` Jonas Theisen
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-04-30 15:07 [PATCH v5 " Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 01/28] KVM: TDX/VMX: rework EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN into PROT_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 [PATCH v4 00/28] KVM: combined patchset for MBEC/GMET support Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 01/28] KVM: TDX/VMX: rework EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN into PROT_MASK Paolo Bonzini
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