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From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de, "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [Part1 PATCH v6 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active
Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2017 10:34:23 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171016153423.2980-18-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171016153423.2980-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

The guest physical memory area holding the struct pvclock_wall_clock and
struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info are shared with the hypervisor. It
periodically updates the contents of the memory. When SEV is active, we
must clear the encryption attributes from the shared memory pages so that
both hypervisor and guest can access the data.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c  |  5 ++--
 arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
index 1911310959f8..d63053142b16 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
@@ -114,10 +114,11 @@ static int vvar_fault(const struct vm_special_mapping *sm,
 		struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *pvti =
 			pvclock_pvti_cpu0_va();
 		if (pvti && vclock_was_used(VCLOCK_PVCLOCK)) {
-			ret = vm_insert_pfn(
+			ret = vm_insert_pfn_prot(
 				vma,
 				vmf->address,
-				__pa(pvti) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+				__pa(pvti) >> PAGE_SHIFT,
+				pgprot_decrypted(vma->vm_page_prot));
 		}
 	} else if (sym_offset == image->sym_hvclock_page) {
 		struct ms_hyperv_tsc_page *tsc_pg = hv_get_tsc_page();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
index d88967659098..3de184be0887 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/sched/clock.h>
 
+#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
 #include <asm/x86_init.h>
 #include <asm/reboot.h>
 #include <asm/kvmclock.h>
@@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ early_param("no-kvmclock", parse_no_kvmclock);
 
 /* The hypervisor will put information about time periodically here */
 static struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *hv_clock;
-static struct pvclock_wall_clock wall_clock;
+static struct pvclock_wall_clock *wall_clock;
 
 struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *pvclock_pvti_cpu0_va(void)
 {
@@ -64,15 +65,15 @@ static void kvm_get_wallclock(struct timespec *now)
 	int low, high;
 	int cpu;
 
-	low = (int)__pa_symbol(&wall_clock);
-	high = ((u64)__pa_symbol(&wall_clock) >> 32);
+	low = (int)slow_virt_to_phys(wall_clock);
+	high = ((u64)slow_virt_to_phys(wall_clock) >> 32);
 
 	native_write_msr(msr_kvm_wall_clock, low, high);
 
 	cpu = get_cpu();
 
 	vcpu_time = &hv_clock[cpu].pvti;
-	pvclock_read_wallclock(&wall_clock, vcpu_time, now);
+	pvclock_read_wallclock(wall_clock, vcpu_time, now);
 
 	put_cpu();
 }
@@ -249,11 +250,39 @@ static void kvm_shutdown(void)
 	native_machine_shutdown();
 }
 
+static phys_addr_t __init kvm_memblock_alloc(phys_addr_t size,
+					     phys_addr_t align)
+{
+	phys_addr_t mem;
+
+	mem = memblock_alloc(size, align);
+	if (!mem)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (sev_active()) {
+		if (early_set_memory_decrypted(mem, size))
+			goto e_free;
+	}
+
+	return mem;
+e_free:
+	memblock_free(mem, size);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void __init kvm_memblock_free(phys_addr_t addr, phys_addr_t size)
+{
+	if (sev_active())
+		early_set_memory_encrypted(addr, size);
+
+	memblock_free(addr, size);
+}
+
 void __init kvmclock_init(void)
 {
 	struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info *vcpu_time;
-	unsigned long mem;
-	int size, cpu;
+	unsigned long mem, mem_wall_clock;
+	int size, cpu, wall_clock_size;
 	u8 flags;
 
 	size = PAGE_ALIGN(sizeof(struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info)*NR_CPUS);
@@ -267,21 +296,35 @@ void __init kvmclock_init(void)
 	} else if (!(kvmclock && kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE)))
 		return;
 
-	printk(KERN_INFO "kvm-clock: Using msrs %x and %x",
-		msr_kvm_system_time, msr_kvm_wall_clock);
+	wall_clock_size = PAGE_ALIGN(sizeof(struct pvclock_wall_clock));
+	mem_wall_clock = kvm_memblock_alloc(wall_clock_size, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (!mem_wall_clock)
+		return;
 
-	mem = memblock_alloc(size, PAGE_SIZE);
-	if (!mem)
+	wall_clock = __va(mem_wall_clock);
+	memset(wall_clock, 0, wall_clock_size);
+
+	mem = kvm_memblock_alloc(size, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (!mem) {
+		kvm_memblock_free(mem_wall_clock, wall_clock_size);
+		wall_clock = NULL;
 		return;
+	}
+
 	hv_clock = __va(mem);
 	memset(hv_clock, 0, size);
 
 	if (kvm_register_clock("primary cpu clock")) {
 		hv_clock = NULL;
-		memblock_free(mem, size);
+		kvm_memblock_free(mem, size);
+		kvm_memblock_free(mem_wall_clock, wall_clock_size);
+		wall_clock = NULL;
 		return;
 	}
 
+	printk(KERN_INFO "kvm-clock: Using msrs %x and %x",
+		msr_kvm_system_time, msr_kvm_wall_clock);
+
 	if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT))
 		pvclock_set_flags(PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT);
 
-- 
2.9.5

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-10-16 15:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-10-16 15:34 [Part1 PATCH v6 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 02/17] x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 16:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 17:46     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 18:18       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 19:51   ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 03/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 04/17] x86/realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 05/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 06/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 08/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 09/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 10/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 11/17] x86/mm: Add DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 12/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 14/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 18:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 19:56   ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 21:25     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 15/17] percpu: Introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 16/17] X86/KVM: Decrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 22:24   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-17  1:43     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-17  8:20       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-17 11:54         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-17 13:35           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-17 15:42             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-17 16:23               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-19 13:44   ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-19 15:40     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 15:34 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-10-19 13:47   ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:42 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20  9:24 ` Borislav Petkov

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