From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [Part1 PATCH v6 02/17] x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2017 10:34:08 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171016153423.2980-3-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171016153423.2980-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Provide support for Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV). This initial
support defines a flag that is used by the kernel to determine if it is
running with SEV active.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 6 ++++++
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/mem_encrypt.h | 7 +++++--
3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 6a77c63540f7..2b024741bce9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
void swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size);
+bool sme_active(void);
+bool sev_active(void);
+
#else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
#define sme_me_mask 0ULL
@@ -64,6 +67,9 @@ static inline void __init sme_early_init(void) { }
static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) { }
static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
+static inline bool sme_active(void) { return false; }
+static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; }
+
#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 16c5f37933a2..af7f733f6f31 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ static char sme_cmdline_off[] __initdata = "off";
u64 sme_me_mask __section(.data) = 0;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
+static bool sev_enabled __section(.data) = false;
+
/* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */
static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
@@ -192,6 +194,30 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void)
protection_map[i] = pgprot_encrypted(protection_map[i]);
}
+/*
+ * SME and SEV are very similar but they are not the same, so there are
+ * times that the kernel will need to distinguish between SME and SEV. The
+ * sme_active() and sev_active() functions are used for this. When a
+ * distinction isn't needed, the mem_encrypt_active() function can be used.
+ *
+ * The trampoline code is a good example for this requirement. Before
+ * paging is activated, SME will access all memory as decrypted, but SEV
+ * will access all memory as encrypted. So, when APs are being brought
+ * up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV
+ * the trampoline area must be encrypted.
+ */
+bool sme_active(void)
+{
+ return sme_me_mask && !sev_enabled;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_active);
+
+bool sev_active(void)
+{
+ return sme_me_mask && sev_enabled;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_active);
+
/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
{
diff --git a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
index 265a9cd21cb4..b310a9c18113 100644
--- a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -23,11 +23,14 @@
#define sme_me_mask 0ULL
+static inline bool sme_active(void) { return false; }
+static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; }
+
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT */
-static inline bool sme_active(void)
+static inline bool mem_encrypt_active(void)
{
- return !!sme_me_mask;
+ return sme_me_mask;
}
static inline u64 sme_get_me_mask(void)
--
2.9.5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-10-16 15:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-16 15:34 [Part1 PATCH v6 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-10-16 16:21 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 02/17] x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 17:46 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 18:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 19:51 ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 03/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 04/17] x86/realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 05/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 06/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 08/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 09/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 10/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 11/17] x86/mm: Add DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 12/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 14/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 18:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 19:56 ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 21:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 15/17] percpu: Introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 16/17] X86/KVM: Decrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 22:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-17 1:43 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-17 8:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-17 11:54 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-17 13:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-17 15:42 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-17 16:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-19 13:44 ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-19 15:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-19 13:47 ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:42 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 9:24 ` Borislav Petkov
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