From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, x86@kernel.org,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Part1 PATCH v6 16/17] X86/KVM: Decrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active
Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2017 20:43:15 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <de38a1ba-98f6-e7c8-427d-f717fa126db5@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171016222416.x26tp222x2ox3tkz@pd.tnic>
On 10/16/17 5:24 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
...
>>
>> +static inline void __set_percpu_decrypted(void *ptr, unsigned long size)
>> +{
>> + early_set_memory_decrypted(slow_virt_to_phys(ptr), size);
>> +}
> Ok, so this looks like useless conversion:
>
> you pass in a virtual address, it gets converted to a physical address
> with slow_virt_to_phys() and then in early_set_memory_enc_dec() gets
> converted to a virtual address again.
>
> Why? Why not pass the virtual address directly?
Actually, I worked to enable the kvmclock support before the
kvm-stealtime, eoi and apf_reason. The kvmclock uses memblock_alloc() to
allocate the shared memory and since the memblock_alloc() returns the
physical address hence I used the same input type as a argument to the
early_set_memory_decrypted(). If you want me to change the input to
accept the virtual address then I have no issue doing so. But the
changes need to propagated to kvmclock (i.e PATCH 17/17) to use __va().
Please let me know if you want me to pass the virtual address.
>> +/*
>> + * Iterate through all possible CPUs and map the memory region pointed
>> + * by apf_reason, steal_time and kvm_apic_eoi as decrypted at once.
>> + *
>> + * Note: we iterate through all possible CPUs to ensure that CPUs
>> + * hotplugged will have their per-cpu variable already mapped as
>> + * decrypted.
>> + */
>> +static void __init sev_map_percpu_data(void)
>> +{
>> + int cpu;
>> +
>> + if (!sev_active())
>> + return;
>> +
>> + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
>> + __set_percpu_decrypted(&per_cpu(apf_reason, cpu), sizeof(apf_reason));
>> + __set_percpu_decrypted(&per_cpu(steal_time, cpu), sizeof(steal_time));
>> + __set_percpu_decrypted(&per_cpu(kvm_apic_eoi, cpu), sizeof(kvm_apic_eoi));
>> + }
>> +}
>> +
>> #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
>> static void __init kvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
>> {
>> + sev_map_percpu_data();
>> kvm_guest_cpu_init();
>> native_smp_prepare_boot_cpu();
>> kvm_spinlock_init();
>> @@ -496,6 +524,7 @@ void __init kvm_guest_init(void)
>> kvm_cpu_online, kvm_cpu_down_prepare) < 0)
>> pr_err("kvm_guest: Failed to install cpu hotplug callbacks\n");
>> #else
>> + sev_map_percpu_data();
>> kvm_guest_cpu_init();
>> #endif
> Why isn't it enough to call
>
> sev_map_percpu_data()
>
> at the end of kvm_guest_init() only but you have to call it in
> kvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu() too? I mean, once you map those things
> decrypted, there's no need to do them again...
>
IIRC, we tried clearing C bit in kvm_guest_init() but since the
kvm_guest_init() is called before setup_per_cpu_areas() hence
per_cpu_ptr(var, cpu_id) was not able to get another processors copy of
the variable.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-10-17 1:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-16 15:34 [Part1 PATCH v6 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 02/17] x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 16:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 17:46 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 18:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 19:51 ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 03/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 04/17] x86/realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 05/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 06/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 08/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 09/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 10/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 11/17] x86/mm: Add DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 12/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 14/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 18:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 19:56 ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 21:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 15/17] percpu: Introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 16/17] X86/KVM: Decrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 22:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-17 1:43 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-10-17 8:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-17 11:54 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-17 13:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-17 15:42 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-17 16:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-19 13:44 ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-19 15:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-19 13:47 ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:42 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 9:24 ` Borislav Petkov
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