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From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, x86@kernel.org,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Part1 PATCH v6 16/17] X86/KVM: Decrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active
Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2017 20:43:15 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <de38a1ba-98f6-e7c8-427d-f717fa126db5@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171016222416.x26tp222x2ox3tkz@pd.tnic>



On 10/16/17 5:24 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
...

>>  
>> +static inline void __set_percpu_decrypted(void *ptr, unsigned long size)
>> +{
>> +	early_set_memory_decrypted(slow_virt_to_phys(ptr), size);
>> +}
> Ok, so this looks like useless conversion:
>
> you pass in a virtual address, it gets converted to a physical address
> with slow_virt_to_phys() and then in early_set_memory_enc_dec() gets
> converted to a virtual address again.
>
> Why? Why not pass the virtual address directly?


Actually, I worked to enable the kvmclock support before the
kvm-stealtime, eoi and apf_reason. The kvmclock uses memblock_alloc() to
allocate the shared memory and since the memblock_alloc() returns the
physical address hence I used the same input type as a argument to the
early_set_memory_decrypted(). If you want me to change the input to
accept the virtual address then I have no issue doing so. But the
changes need to propagated to kvmclock (i.e PATCH 17/17) to use __va().
Please let me know if you want me to pass the virtual address.


>> +/*
>> + * Iterate through all possible CPUs and map the memory region pointed
>> + * by apf_reason, steal_time and kvm_apic_eoi as decrypted at once.
>> + *
>> + * Note: we iterate through all possible CPUs to ensure that CPUs
>> + * hotplugged will have their per-cpu variable already mapped as
>> + * decrypted.
>> + */
>> +static void __init sev_map_percpu_data(void)
>> +{
>> +	int cpu;
>> +
>> +	if (!sev_active())
>> +		return;
>> +
>> +	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
>> +		__set_percpu_decrypted(&per_cpu(apf_reason, cpu), sizeof(apf_reason));
>> +		__set_percpu_decrypted(&per_cpu(steal_time, cpu), sizeof(steal_time));
>> +		__set_percpu_decrypted(&per_cpu(kvm_apic_eoi, cpu), sizeof(kvm_apic_eoi));
>> +	}
>> +}
>> +
>>  #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
>>  static void __init kvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
>>  {
>> +	sev_map_percpu_data();
>>  	kvm_guest_cpu_init();
>>  	native_smp_prepare_boot_cpu();
>>  	kvm_spinlock_init();
>> @@ -496,6 +524,7 @@ void __init kvm_guest_init(void)
>>  				      kvm_cpu_online, kvm_cpu_down_prepare) < 0)
>>  		pr_err("kvm_guest: Failed to install cpu hotplug callbacks\n");
>>  #else
>> +	sev_map_percpu_data();
>>  	kvm_guest_cpu_init();
>>  #endif
> Why isn't it enough to call
>
> 	sev_map_percpu_data()
>
> at the end of kvm_guest_init() only but you have to call it in
> kvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu() too? I mean, once you map those things
> decrypted, there's no need to do them again...
>

IIRC, we tried clearing C bit in kvm_guest_init() but since the
kvm_guest_init() is called before setup_per_cpu_areas() hence
per_cpu_ptr(var, cpu_id) was not able to get another processors copy of
the variable.

  reply	other threads:[~2017-10-17  1:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-10-16 15:34 [Part1 PATCH v6 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 02/17] x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 16:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 17:46     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 18:18       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 19:51   ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 03/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 04/17] x86/realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 05/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 06/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 08/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 09/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 10/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 11/17] x86/mm: Add DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 12/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 14/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 18:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 19:56   ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 21:25     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 15/17] percpu: Introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 16/17] X86/KVM: Decrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 22:24   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-17  1:43     ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-10-17  8:20       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-17 11:54         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-17 13:35           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-17 15:42             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-17 16:23               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-19 13:44   ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-19 15:40     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-19 13:47   ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:42 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20  9:24 ` Borislav Petkov

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