From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Radim KrÄ?mář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Part1 PATCH v6 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD)
Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2017 11:24:53 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171020092453.lnldafrdztjhoijp@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171016153423.2980-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 10:34:06AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> This part of Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) series focuses on the
> changes required in a guest OS for SEV support.
...
> ---
> This series is based on tip/master commit : 3594329f88c5 (Merge branch 'linus')
>
> Complete git tree is available: https://github.com/codomania/tip/tree/v6-p1
>
> Changes since v5:
> * enhance early_set_memory_decrypted() to do memory contents encrypt/decrypt in
> addition to C bit changes.
Ok, this passes testing here. Please add the randconfig hunk from
yesterday and send what would look like a final v7! :-)
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Thanks!
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-10-20 9:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-16 15:34 Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 02/17] x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 16:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 17:46 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 18:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 19:51 ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 03/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 04/17] x86/realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 05/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 06/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 08/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 09/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 10/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 11/17] x86/mm: Add DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 12/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 14/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 18:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 19:56 ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 21:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 15/17] percpu: Introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 16/17] X86/KVM: Decrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 22:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-17 1:43 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-17 8:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-17 11:54 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-17 13:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-17 15:42 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-17 16:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-19 13:44 ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-19 15:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-19 13:47 ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:42 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 9:24 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
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