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From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [Part1 PATCH v6 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2017 10:34:13 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171016153423.2980-8-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171016153423.2980-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

EFI data is encrypted when the kernel is run under SEV. Update the
page table references to be sure the EFI memory areas are accessed
encrypted.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
 arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
index 12e83888e5b9..5469c9319f43 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #include <linux/reboot.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/ucs2_string.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
 
 #include <asm/setup.h>
 #include <asm/page.h>
@@ -369,7 +370,11 @@ int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
 	 * as trim_bios_range() will reserve the first page and isolate it away
 	 * from memory allocators anyway.
 	 */
-	if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, 0x0, 0x0, 1, _PAGE_RW)) {
+	pf = _PAGE_RW;
+	if (sev_active())
+		pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
+
+	if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, 0x0, 0x0, 1, pf)) {
 		pr_err("Failed to create 1:1 mapping for the first page!\n");
 		return 1;
 	}
@@ -412,6 +417,9 @@ static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va)
 	if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB))
 		flags |= _PAGE_PCD;
 
+	if (sev_active())
+		flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
+
 	pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 	if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, va, md->num_pages, flags))
 		pr_warn("Error mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n",
@@ -538,6 +546,9 @@ static int __init efi_update_mem_attr(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *m
 	if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO))
 		pf |= _PAGE_RW;
 
+	if (sev_active())
+		pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
+
 	return efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
 }
 
@@ -589,6 +600,9 @@ void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void)
 			(md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE))
 			pf |= _PAGE_RW;
 
+		if (sev_active())
+			pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
+
 		efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
 	}
 }
-- 
2.9.5

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-10-16 15:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-10-16 15:34 [Part1 PATCH v6 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 02/17] x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 16:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 17:46     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 18:18       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 19:51   ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 03/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 04/17] x86/realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 05/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 06/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 08/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 09/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 10/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 11/17] x86/mm: Add DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 12/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 14/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 18:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 19:56   ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 21:25     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 15/17] percpu: Introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 16/17] X86/KVM: Decrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 22:24   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-17  1:43     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-17  8:20       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-17 11:54         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-17 13:35           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-17 15:42             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-17 16:23               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-19 13:44   ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-19 15:40     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-16 15:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-19 13:47   ` [Part1 PATCH v6.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-16 15:42 ` [Part1 PATCH v6 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20  9:24 ` Borislav Petkov

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