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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
	David.Kaplan@amd.com, Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com,
	jpoimboe@kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Subject: [RFC][PATCH 02/17] x86/cpu: Clean up SRSO return thunk mess
Date: Wed, 09 Aug 2023 09:12:20 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230809072200.543939260@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230809071218.000335006@infradead.org>

Use the existing configurable return thunk. There is absolute no
justification for having created this __x86_return_thunk alternative.

To clarify, the whole thing looks like:

Zen3/4 does:

  srso_alias_untrain_ret:
	  nop2
	  lfence
	  jmp srso_alias_return_thunk
	  int3

  srso_alias_safe_ret: // aliasses srso_alias_untrain_ret just so
	  add $8, %rsp
	  ret
	  int3

  srso_alias_return_thunk:
	  call srso_alias_safe_ret
	  ud2

While Zen1/2 does:

  srso_untrain_ret:
	  movabs $foo, %rax
	  lfence
	  call srso_safe_ret           (jmp srso_return_thunk ?)
	  int3

  srso_safe_ret: // embedded in movabs immediate
	  add $8,%rsp
          ret
          int3

  srso_return_thunk:
	  call srso_safe_ret
	  ud2

While retbleed does:

  zen_untrain_ret:
	  test $0xcc, %bl
	  lfence
	  jmp zen_return_thunk
          int3

  zen_return_thunk: // embedded in the test instruction
	  ret
          int3

Where Zen1/2 flush the BTB using the instruction decoder trick
(test,movabs) Zen3/4 use instruction aliasing. SRSO adds RSB (RAP in
AMD speak) stuffing to force a return mis-predict.

That is; the AMD retbleed is a form of Speculative-Type-Confusion
where the branch predictor is trained to use the BTB to predict the
RET address, while AMD inception/SRSO is a form of
Speculative-Type-Confusion where another instruction is trained to be
treated like a CALL instruction and poison the RSB (RAP).

Pick one of three options at boot.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |    4 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           |    7 ++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S        |    2 -
 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S             |   37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -342,9 +342,13 @@ extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_
 extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_jump_thunk_array[];
 
 extern void __x86_return_thunk(void);
+extern void srso_return_thunk(void);
+extern void srso_alias_return_thunk(void);
+
 extern void zen_untrain_ret(void);
 extern void srso_untrain_ret(void);
 extern void srso_untrain_ret_alias(void);
+
 extern void entry_ibpb(void);
 
 extern void (*x86_return_thunk)(void);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2305,10 +2305,13 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigatio
 			 */
 			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
 
-			if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19)
+			if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19) {
 				setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS);
-			else
+				x86_return_thunk = srso_alias_return_thunk;
+			} else {
 				setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO);
+				x86_return_thunk = srso_return_thunk;
+			}
 			srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET;
 		} else {
 			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n");
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ INIT_PER_CPU(irq_stack_backing_store);
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
-. = ASSERT((__ret & 0x3f) == 0, "__ret not cacheline-aligned");
+. = ASSERT((__x86_return_thunk & 0x3f) == 0, "__x86_return_thunk not cacheline-aligned");
 . = ASSERT((srso_safe_ret & 0x3f) == 0, "srso_safe_ret not cacheline-aligned");
 #endif
 
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -151,10 +151,11 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_jump_thunk_a
 	.section .text.__x86.rethunk_untrain
 
 SYM_START(srso_untrain_ret_alias, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
+	UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
 	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
 	ASM_NOP2
 	lfence
-	jmp __x86_return_thunk
+	jmp srso_alias_return_thunk
 SYM_FUNC_END(srso_untrain_ret_alias)
 __EXPORT_THUNK(srso_untrain_ret_alias)
 
@@ -184,7 +185,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(srso_safe_ret_alias)
  *    from re-poisioning the BTB prediction.
  */
 	.align 64
-	.skip 64 - (__ret - zen_untrain_ret), 0xcc
+	.skip 64 - (__x86_return_thunk - zen_untrain_ret), 0xcc
 SYM_START(zen_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
 	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
 	/*
@@ -216,10 +217,10 @@ SYM_START(zen_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL,
 	 * evicted, __x86_return_thunk will suffer Straight Line Speculation
 	 * which will be contained safely by the INT3.
 	 */
-SYM_INNER_LABEL(__ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(__x86_return_thunk, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	ret
 	int3
-SYM_CODE_END(__ret)
+SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk)
 
 	/*
 	 * Ensure the TEST decoding / BTB invalidation is complete.
@@ -230,11 +231,13 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__ret)
 	 * Jump back and execute the RET in the middle of the TEST instruction.
 	 * INT3 is for SLS protection.
 	 */
-	jmp __ret
+	jmp __x86_return_thunk
 	int3
 SYM_FUNC_END(zen_untrain_ret)
 __EXPORT_THUNK(zen_untrain_ret)
 
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_return_thunk)
+
 /*
  * SRSO untraining sequence for Zen1/2, similar to zen_untrain_ret()
  * above. On kernel entry, srso_untrain_ret() is executed which is a
@@ -257,6 +260,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(srso_safe_ret, SYM_L_GLO
 	int3
 	int3
 	int3
+	/* end of movabs */
 	lfence
 	call srso_safe_ret
 	int3
@@ -264,12 +268,23 @@ SYM_CODE_END(srso_safe_ret)
 SYM_FUNC_END(srso_untrain_ret)
 __EXPORT_THUNK(srso_untrain_ret)
 
-SYM_FUNC_START(__x86_return_thunk)
-	ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp __ret", "call srso_safe_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO, \
-			"call srso_safe_ret_alias", X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS
-	int3
-SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk)
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_return_thunk)
+/*
+ * Both these do an unbalanced CALL to mess up the RSB, terminate with UD2
+ * to indicate noreturn.
+ */
+SYM_CODE_START(srso_return_thunk)
+	UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
+	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+	call srso_safe_ret
+	ud2
+SYM_CODE_END(srso_return_thunk)
+
+SYM_CODE_START(srso_alias_return_thunk)
+	UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
+	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+	call srso_safe_ret_alias
+	ud2
+SYM_CODE_END(srso_alias_return_thunk)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */
 



  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-08-09  7:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 80+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-08-09  7:12 [RFC][PATCH 00/17] Fix up the recent SRSO patches Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 01/17] x86/alternative: Unconditional custom return thunk Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  9:31   ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-08-10 11:37   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-09  7:12 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2023-08-09 15:45   ` [RFC][PATCH 02/17] x86/cpu: Clean up SRSO return thunk mess Nikolay Borisov
2023-08-10 11:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-10 12:37     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-10 12:56       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-10 13:22         ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-11  7:01       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-11 17:00         ` Nick Desaulniers
2023-08-12 11:20           ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 03/17] x86/cpu: Make srso_untrain_ret consistent Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-10 12:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 04/17] objtool/x86: Fix SRSO mess Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-10 12:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-10 12:48     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-10 12:50       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-10 15:02         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-10 15:22           ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 05/17] x86/cpu: Cleanup the untrain mess Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 12:51   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09 13:12     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 13:26       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-12 18:30         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 06/17] x86/cpu: Add SRSO untrain to retbleed= Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 13:42   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09 14:06     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 14:28       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09 15:08         ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 15:43           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09 14:31     ` Andrew.Cooper3
2023-08-09 14:39       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-10 15:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-10 16:10     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-11 10:27       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-12 11:32         ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-12 12:12           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-14 15:45           ` David Laight
2023-08-12 11:24       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-12 12:10         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-14 10:56           ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 07/17] x86/cpu/kvm: Provide UNTRAIN_RET_VM Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 13:50   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09 14:06     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 14:30       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09 15:10         ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-13 10:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-14 10:35     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 08/17] x86/cpu: Add IBPB on VMEXIT to retbleed= Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 09/17] x86: Remove CONFIG_CPU_SRSO Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 13:57   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 10/17] x86: Remove CPU_IBPB_ENTRY Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 11/17] x86/cpu: Remove all SRSO interface nonsense Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 13:10   ` Andrew.Cooper3
2023-08-09 13:36     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 14:05   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09 14:43     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 14:51       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09 15:34   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 12/17] x86/cpu: Rename original retbleed return thunk Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 14:20   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09 14:22     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-10 11:06       ` Andrew.Cooper3
2023-08-10 13:02         ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-13 15:23           ` Andrew.Cooper3
2023-08-14 10:34             ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-14 11:31               ` Andrew.Cooper3
2023-08-14 12:06                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 13/17] objtool/x86: Add arch_is_offset_insn() Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  9:56   ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-08-09 14:34   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 14/17] objtool: Add comments to the arch_is_$foo() magic symbols Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 15/17] x86/cpu: Rename srso_(.*)_alias to srso_alias_\1 Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 16/17] x86/alternatives: Simplify ALTERNATIVE_n() Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 17/17] x86/cpu: Use fancy alternatives to get rid of entry_untrain_ret() Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  9:04 ` [RFC][PATCH 00/17] Fix up the recent SRSO patches Nikolay Borisov
2023-08-09 10:04 ` Andrew.Cooper3
2023-08-09 11:58   ` Peter Zijlstra

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