Re: [RFC][PATCH 11/17] x86/cpu: Remove all SRSO interface nonsense

[Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>]

On Wed, Aug 09, 2023 at 10:05:30AM -0400, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 09, 2023 at 09:12:29AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > @@ -2607,26 +2447,26 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *bu
> >  static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf)
> >  {
> >  	if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET ||
> > +	    retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET_SRSO ||
> > +	    retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET_SRSO_ALIAS ||
> >  	    retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB) {
> 
> These retbleed_show_state() changes probably belong in that other patch
> which adds the retbleed= cmdline options.

Ah yes, lost hunk that. Let me move it there.

> > +
> >  		if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
> >  		    boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
> >  			return sysfs_emit(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk / IBPB on non-AMD based uarch\n");
> >  
> > -		return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation],
> > +		return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT %s%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation],
> >  				  !sched_smt_active() ? "disabled" :
> >  				  spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
> >  				  spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ?
> > -				  "enabled with STIBP protection" : "vulnerable");
> > -	}
> > +				  "enabled with STIBP protection" : "vulnerable",
> > +				  cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode() ? "" : ", no SRSO microcode");
> 
> Hm?  What does missing microcode have to do with SMT?

semi-colon then, instead of comma ?