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From: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David.Kaplan@amd.com,
	Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com, jpoimboe@kernel.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 00/17] Fix up the recent SRSO patches
Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2023 12:04:16 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e417a89e-15af-e6ed-5df5-382640dd9eeb@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230809071218.000335006@infradead.org>



On 9.08.23 г. 10:12 ч., Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> Since I wasn't invited to the party (even though I did retbleed), I get to
> clean things up afterwards :/
> 
> Anyway, this here overhauls the SRSO patches in a big way.
> 
> I claim that AMD retbleed (also called Speculative-Type-Confusion -- not to be
> confused with Intel retbleed, which is an entirely different bug) is
> fundamentally the same as this SRSO -- which is also caused by STC. And the
> mitigations are so similar they should all be controlled from a single spot and
> not conflated like they are now.
> 
> As such, at the end of the ride the new kernel command line and srso sysfs
> files are no more and all we're left with is a few extra retbleed options.
> 
> Aside of that; this deals with a few implementation issues -- but not all known
> issues. Josh and Andrew are telling me there's a problem when running inside
> virt due to how this checks the microcode. I'm hoping either of those two gents
> will add a patch to address this.

The microcode issue should have been fixed as Boris added a safe_wrmsr 
call which checks for the presence of SBPB bit on zen3/4.


> 
> 
> 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-08-09  9:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 93+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-08-09  7:12 Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 01/17] x86/alternative: Unconditional custom return thunk Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  9:31   ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-08-10 11:37   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 02/17] x86/cpu: Clean up SRSO return thunk mess Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 15:45   ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-08-10 11:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-10 12:37     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-10 12:56       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-10 13:22         ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-11  7:01       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-11 17:00         ` Nick Desaulniers
2023-08-12 11:20           ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 03/17] x86/cpu: Make srso_untrain_ret consistent Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-10 12:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 04/17] objtool/x86: Fix SRSO mess Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-10 12:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-10 12:48     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-10 12:50       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-10 15:02         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-10 15:22           ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 05/17] x86/cpu: Cleanup the untrain mess Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 12:51   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09 13:12     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 13:26       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-12 18:30         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 06/17] x86/cpu: Add SRSO untrain to retbleed= Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 13:42   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09 14:06     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 14:28       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09 15:08         ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 15:43           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09 14:31     ` Andrew.Cooper3
2023-08-09 14:39       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-10 15:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-10 16:10     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-11 10:27       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-12 11:32         ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-12 12:12           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-14 15:45           ` David Laight
2023-08-12 11:24       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-12 12:10         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-14 10:56           ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 07/17] x86/cpu/kvm: Provide UNTRAIN_RET_VM Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 13:50   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09 14:06     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 14:30       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09 15:10         ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-13 10:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-14 10:35     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 08/17] x86/cpu: Add IBPB on VMEXIT to retbleed= Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 09/17] x86: Remove CONFIG_CPU_SRSO Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 13:57   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 10/17] x86: Remove CPU_IBPB_ENTRY Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 11/17] x86/cpu: Remove all SRSO interface nonsense Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 13:10   ` Andrew.Cooper3
2023-08-09 13:36     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 14:05   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09 14:43     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 14:51       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09 15:34   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 12/17] x86/cpu: Rename original retbleed return thunk Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09 14:20   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09 14:22     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-10 11:06       ` Andrew.Cooper3
2023-08-10 13:02         ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-13 15:23           ` Andrew.Cooper3
2023-08-14 10:34             ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-14 11:31               ` Andrew.Cooper3
2023-08-14 12:06                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 13/17] objtool/x86: Add arch_is_offset_insn() Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  9:56   ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-08-09 14:34   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 14/17] objtool: Add comments to the arch_is_$foo() magic symbols Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 15/17] x86/cpu: Rename srso_(.*)_alias to srso_alias_\1 Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 16/17] x86/alternatives: Simplify ALTERNATIVE_n() Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  7:12 ` [RFC][PATCH 17/17] x86/cpu: Use fancy alternatives to get rid of entry_untrain_ret() Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-09  9:04 ` Nikolay Borisov [this message]
2023-08-09 10:04 ` [RFC][PATCH 00/17] Fix up the recent SRSO patches Andrew.Cooper3
2023-08-09 11:58   ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-01-27 18:58 a-development
2024-01-27 19:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-27 19:27   ` a-development
2024-01-27 19:41     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-29 18:18       ` a-development
2024-03-26 22:21         ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-16  6:48           ` a-development
2024-04-16  8:45             ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-16 20:14               ` a-development
2024-04-17  8:08                 ` a-development
2024-04-17  9:12                   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-22  7:01                     ` a-development
2024-01-27 19:28   ` a-development

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